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CONTRACTS AS SYSTEMS
SPENCER WILLIAMS*
ABSTRACT

A contract is much more complex than its individual terms would
suggest. Yet contract scholars have traditionally taken a reductionist
approach to the study of contracts. According to "contractual
reductionism," a contract can be understood through each of its
constituent terms. Recent scholarship, however, has begun to challenge
contractual reductionism's term-by-term view of contracts. Building on
this work, this Article provides the first application of complex systems
theory to contracts, arguing that a contract is a complex system that is
greaterthan the sum of its terms. A complex system is composed of many
components that interactin a nontrivial manner. Complex systems theory
is an interdisciplinaryfield of study that has been used to analyze a broad
range of complex systems including living organisms, cities, economies,
technology systems, and ecosystems. One of the key findings of complex
systems theory is that complex systems exhibit a surprising degree of
similarity and common behavior across diverse contexts - a finding that
holds when extended to contracts. To provide a framework for
understanding and analyzing a contract as a complex system, the Article
models a contractusing concepts drawnfrom complex systems theory. The
Article then uses this model to demonstrate that contract systems exhibit
many key propertiesobserved in other complex systems. The Article ends
by discussing how a complex systems approach to contracts informs
contract design, interpretation, and analysis. The Article makes three
primary contributions. First, the Article extends the scholarship
challenging contractual reductionism through the first application of
complex systems theory to contracts. Second, the Article models a contract
as a complex system and identifies key properties of contract systems.
Third, the Article shows how complex systems theory can be used to
improve the design, interpretation,and analysis of contracts. The Article's
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findings have significant implications for lawyers, judges, and legal
technology companies.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A contract is much more complex than its individual terms would
suggest.' Yet contract scholars have traditionally taken a term-by-term,

'See infra Section III.C.1. (discussing the meaning of "complex" in the context of
complex systems).
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reductionist approach to the study of contracts. 2 According to "contractual
reductionism," a contract can be understood through each of its constituent
terms.3 This reductionist view of contracts has influenced many of the key
theoretical discussions in contract scholarship, including contract design,
interpretation, and the role of the transactional lawyer.4 Beyond contract
theory, empirical studies of contracts have largely focused on individual
terms and their effects rather than viewing these terms as parts of a greater
contractual whole.' Furthermore, many legal technology companies
developing contract analysis products, such as natural language processing
and machine learning-assisted prediction, have built their products based
on reductionist models of contracts. 6
Contractual reductionism
overlooks the complexity and
significance of macro-level effects in contracts.7 Recent scholarship,
however, has begun to challenge contractual reductionism., This line of
scholarship started with a focus on the importance of modularity in
contract design., Scholars then evaluated interaction effects in the context
of vague terms, 0 the use of multiple contracts to effectuate a single deal,"
and the multidimensional nature of contracts designed to respond to a
variety of transaction costs. 2 Most recently, Cathy Hwang and Matthew
Jennejohn analyzed the role of contract structure in contract design and
interpretation, proposing a theory of "contractual structuralism."" While

2

See Cathy Hwang & Matthew Jennejohn, Deal Structure, 113 Nw. U. L. REv. 279,
281-83, 293 (2018); see infra Section IL.A. (discussing traditional contractual reductionism).
3
See infra Section H.A.
4
See infra Section ILA.
'See infra Section HA.
6
See infra Section IV.C.
'See Hwang & Jennejohn, supra note 2, at 282-84.
,See infra Section II.B.
9
See Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts:Boilerplate andInformation Flow, 104
MICH. L. REv. 1175, 1179-80, 1187-99 (2006); see Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate Today:
The Rise of Modularity and the Waning of Consent, 104 MICH. L. REv. 1223, 1223-26 (2006);
see also George G. Triantis, Improving Contract Quality: Modularity, Technology, and
Innovation in ContractDesign, 18 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 177, 191-92 (2013).
' 0See Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in ContractDesign: The Case
of Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848, 852-55, 859-60, 921-24 (2010) (arguing that
vague terms combined with liquidated damages clauses and dispute resolution provisions can
reduce moral hazard and adverse selection).
"See Cathy Hwang, Unbundled Bargains: Multi-Agreement Dealmaking in Complex
Mergers and Acquisitions, 164 U. PA. L. REv. 1403, 1408-09 (2016) (discussing how complex
deals, particularly M&A transactions, are effectuated using multiple interconnected contracts).
"See Matthew Jennejohn, The Private Order ofInnovation Networks, 68 STAN. L. REV.
281, 313-28, 363-64 (2016) (proposing a framework of "multivalent contracting," in which a
variety of contract terms are used in an integrated fashion to respond to a variety of transaction
costs).
3
1 See Hwang & Jennejohn, supranote 2, at 281, 284-85.
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'

these works have implicated the systemic nature of contracts, none have
fully addressed contracts as systems.
Building on this scholarship, this Article provides the first
application of complex systems theory to contracts, arguing that a contract
4
is a complex system that is greater than the sum of its terms. A complex
system is composed of many components that interact in a nontrivial
manner. 5 In the case of a contract, the contract is the system and the terms
are the components.1 6 Complex systems theory is an interdisciplinary field
of study that has been used to analyze a broad range of complex systems,
including living organisms, cities, economies, technology systems, and
ecosystems." In the context of complex systems theory, "complex" refers
to the degree of interaction between the components of a system." The
primary goal of complex systems theory is to understand the behavior of
9
complex systems for analytical and predictive purposes.1 One of the key
findings of complex systems theory has been that complex systems exhibit
a surprising degree of similarity and common behavior across diverse
2
contexts-a finding that remains consistent when extended to contracts.
While complex systems theory has existed for decades, it has experienced
2
a recent resurgence due to advances in computing and data collection.
Despite being applied to a variety of fields such as physics, biology,
economics, and computer science, complex systems theory remains
relatively underexplored in legal scholarship, particularly in contract and
business law. 2
To provide a framework for understanding and analyzing a contract
as a complex system, this Article models a contract using concepts drawn
from complex systems theory.Y In this model, a contract system is
represented as a coevolving multilayer network.24 The system exists within
an environment that contains external conditions such as contract law and
norms., The terms of the contract and the interactions between the terms
evolve over time in tandem. 26 The Article then uses this model to

4

See infra Section
"See infra Section
6
1 See infra Section
7
1 See infra Section
"See infra Section
'9See infra Section
20
See infra Section
2
'See infra Section
"See infra Section
"See infra Section
4
1 See infra Section
"See infra Section
"See infra Section
1

hL A.
III.A.

III.B.

hI.A.
II.A.

hLIA.
IIlA.
III.A.
IIlA.

IIB.
I.B.
II.B.
III.B.

(providing an overview of complex systems theory).
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demonstrate that contract systems exhibit many key properties observed
in other complex systems, including organized complexity, hierarchy,
emergence, adaptation, sensitivity to initial conditions, nonlinearity, and
punctuated equilibria.27 The Article ends by discussing how a complex
systems approach to contracts informs contract design, interpretation, and
analysis.21
This Article makes three primary contributions. First, the Article
extends the scholarship challenging contractual reductionism through the
first application of complex systems theory to contracts. 29 Second, the
Article models a contract as a complex system and identifies key
properties of contract systems. 30 Third, the Article shows how complex
systems theory can be used to improve the design, interpretation, and
analysis of contracts." The Article's findings have significant implications
for lawyers, judges, and legal technology companies.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Section II
discusses the traditional reductionist approach to contracts and the recent
scholarship challenging contractual reductionism." Section III provides a
brief overview of complex systems theory, uses complex systems theory
to model a contract as a complex system, and identifies key properties of
contract systems.33 Section IV discusses the implications of a complex
systems approach to contracts for contract design, interpretation, and
analysis." The Article concludes with a discussion of opportunities for
further research."
II. CONTRACTUAL REDUCTIONISM

This section examines contractual reductionism and the recent
scholarship challenging this longstanding approach to the study of
contracts. Section II.A discusses the traditional reductionist approach to
contracts. 36 Section II.B highlights the recent work moving away from
contractual reductionism.37

"See infra Section il.C.
28
See infra Section IV.
29
See infra Section II.
"See infra Section III.
3

'See

"See
"See
"See
"See
"See
"See

Infra Section IV.
infra Section II.
infra Section III.
infra Section IV.
infra Conclusion.
infra Section II.A.
infra Section II.B.
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A. The Traditional Reductionist Approach to Contracts
Contract scholars

have

traditionally taken a

term-by-term,

reductionist approach to the study of contracts. 38Reductionism has its roots

in the natural sciences, particularly physics,"9 and has since become
commonplace in the social sciences as well." The core idea of
reductionism is that one can understand the whole by understanding the
parts.41 Similarly, according to "contractual reductionism," one can
understand a contract by understanding each of its constituent terms.42
Contractual reductionism largely stems from the law and economics
"efficient contracting" view of contracts that originated from the Coase
Theorem.4 3 According to efficient contracting, a contract is a collection of
terms that the parties have efficiently selected from the universe of
possible terms to maximize the joint value generated by the contract." If
circumstances change such that the collection of terms in the contract is
no longer optimal, the parties merely add, delete, or modify the individual
terms to move the contract back to optimality. 5 This approach is inherently
reductionist as it places the focus of analysis on the terms of the contract
rather than the contract as a whole.
Contractual reductionism has influenced many of the key theoretical
discussions in contracts scholarship, including contract design,
interpretation, and the role of the transactional lawyer.41 With respect to

"See Hwang & Jennejohn, supra note 2, at 281-83, 293.
9
3 See NEIL JOHNSON, SIMPLY COMPLEXITY: A CLEAR GUIDE TO COMPLEXITY THEORY
17 (2007); see generally JOHN H. MILLER & SCOTT E. PAGE, COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS 10

(2007).

&

"See MILLER & PAGE, supra note 39, at 27.
41
MILLER & PAGE, supra note 39 ("[B]y reducing complicated systems to their
constituent parts, and fully understanding each part, we will then be able to understand the
world.").
42Steven Shavell, On the Writing and the Interpretation of Contracts, 22 J.L. ECON.

ORG. 1, 3 (2006).
"See Smith, supra note 9, at 1187 (discussing how Coase divided "property into its
smallest constituent parts" and then drawing the comparison to dividing contracts into their
constituent terms); see R.H. Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15-16 (1960).
"See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract
Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 544, 552 (2003); see Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete
Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design, 56 CAsE W. RES. L. REV. 187, 188 (2005).
&

"See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 1-39 (HARVARD UNIV. PRESS 1991); see Marcel Kahan

Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd
Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347, 347, 366 (1996); see also Spencer
Williams, Predictive Contracting, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 621, 626 n.18 (2019) (discussing
theoretical and empirical critiques of efficient contracting).
"See Albert Choi & George Triantis, The Effect of Bargaining Power on Contract
Design, 98 VA. L. REV. 1665, 1667 (2012); see also Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by
Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 255 (1984).
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contract design, scholars have typically viewed the "design" of the contract
simply as the collection of terms that make up the contract. 47 Theories of
how lawyers should design contracts are often based on economic models
that assume contracts are decomposable into their constituent terms. 48
Contractual incompleteness, a well-discussed topic in contract design, is
subject to contractual reductionism as well.49 Scholars have argued that
parties make term-by-term decisions regarding the level of specificity for
a term in order to balance the front-end cost of writing a more specific
term with the back-end cost of increased litigation resulting from a less
specific term.50 Furthermore, the scholarly discussion on standardization
has long taken the view that contractual "boilerplate" is merely a collection
of homogenized, easily reusable terms whose primary function is to reduce
transaction costs.5' A similar view has been advanced with respect to
default terms supplied by contract law.2 The timing of term selection has
also been framed in a reductionist manner, with key terms being negotiated
upfront through term sheets and memorandums of understanding and less
important terms being left for later.,' A core assumption running through
much of the contract design scholarship is that terms should be viewed
simply as distinct provisions rather than interconnected parts of a broader
contractual whole.

47
See, e.g., Choi & Triantis, supra note 46, at 1667 (describing contract design as the
nonprice terms in the contract).
48
See, e.g., Shavell, supra note 42, at 2-9.
49
See id at 2.
0
" See Scott & Triantis, supra note 44, at 190-91, 196-97 (distinguishing between frontend costs and back-end costs and discussing how parties balance these costs when designing a
contract); see Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, AnticipatingLitigation in ContractDesign,
115 YALE L.J. 814, 814, 817, 836-38 (2006) (arguing that more specific terms increase frontend costs but decrease back-end costs whereas less specific terms do the opposite).
"See Claire A. Hill, Why Contracts Are Written in "Legalese", 77 CH.-KENT L. REv.
59, 59-63 (2001) (describing the use of "forms" in transactional law); see Michelle E. Boardman,
Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REv. 1105, 1107
(2006) (arguing that boilerplate terms carry less litigation uncertainty and therefore reduce
transaction costs); see also Mrru GULATI & ROBERT SCOTT, THE 3 1/2 MINUTE TRANSACTION
2-3 (2012) (discussing the widespread use of a boilerplate "pari passu" term in sovereign bond
contracts).
"See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis
of the InteractionsBetween Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 261, 262
(1985) (noting that default contract terms reduce transaction costs by providing parties with
standardized and generally applicable "preformulations"). But see Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner,
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:An Economic Theory of DefaultRules, 99 YALE L.J. 87,
90-91 (1989) (arguing that default rules should be unfavorable to incentivize the parties to design
their own transaction-specific terms).
s 3See Albert H. Choi & George Triantis, Designing and Enforcing Preliminary
Agreements, 98 Tex. L. Rev. 440, 440-44 (2020).
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As with contract design, scholarship on contract interpretation has
typically come from a reductionist standpoint. Economic models of
contract interpretation tend to be term-focused.14 The long-standing debate
between textualist interpretation and contextualist interpretation has
generally assumed a term-by-term approach to interpretation." Calls to
embrace both textualism and contextualism have even been based in
reductionism. 56 Discussions of the parol evidence rule, a core interpretive
principle in contract law governing whether outside terms may be added
to a written contract, are similarly reductionist.5? Proposals for alternative
theories of interpretation, such as interpreting contracts in a manner akin
to statutory analysis58 or through surveys59 have also viewed contracts as
collections of terms.
In addition to contract design and interpretation, research into the
role of the transactional lawyer has been based on contractual
reductionism.60 In his pivotal article in 1984, Ronald Gilson characterized
transactional lawyers as "transaction cost engineers."6 1 According to
Gilson, transactional lawyers add value to a transaction by reducing
transaction costs through specific terms such as representations,
warranties, and indemnification provisions.62 Gilson's view of a contract is
a combination of terms that can each be tweaked to reduce transaction

"See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation,83
TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1582 (2005) ("Contract interpretation is the undertaking by a judge or jury.
.. to figure out what the terms of a contract are, or should be understood to be."); see also
Shavell, supra note 42, at 12-18.
55
See Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the
Principlesof Contract Interpretation,146 U. PA. L. REV. 533, 533 (1998) [hereinafter Posner,
ParolEvidence]; see Eric A. Posner, A Theory of ContractLaw Under Conditions of Radical
Judicial Error, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 749, 751 (2000) [hereinafter Posner, Judicial Error];
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 44, at 544, 598; see also Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott,
ContractInterpretationRedux, 119 YALE L.J. 926, 931-32 (2010). Reductionism is present even
in the interpretation of goods contracts under the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), which
explicitly adopts a contextualist approach to interpretation. See Hwang & Jennejohn, supranote
2, at 313-14. Although the U.C.C. requires judges to consider contextual evidence such as usage
of trade when interpreting a goods contract, the contract itself is still primarily seen as a
collection of individual terms.
56
See Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Text and Context: Contract
Interpretationas ContractDesign, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 23, 23-29 (2014).
57
See Posner, ParolEvidence, supranote 55, at 533-40.
5
8See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Contractas Statute, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1129,
1131-32, 1160-61 (2006) (proposing an approach to interpreting boilerplate terms akin to
legislative history where courts look to the intent of the original drafters of a term).
59
See Omri Ben-Shahar & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Interpreting Contracts via Surveys
andExperiments, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1753, 1761-66,1776-78 (2017) (proposing that courts could
use surveys to determine the meaning of contract terms).
"See Gilson, supra note 46, at 255.
61
See Gilson, supra note 46, at 255.
62
See generally Gilson, supranote 46, at 256-93.
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costs.63 Subsequent scholarship has echoed Gilson's reductionist view."
This is especially true of recent research on the value of large law firms,
which finds that large firms add greater value relative to small firms by
compiling data on specific key terms to improve their client's negotiating

leverage."
Beyond contract theory, empirical studies of contracts have largely
focused on individual terms and their effects rather than viewing these
terms as integrated parts of a greater contractual whole. Contractual
reductionism has influenced a wide range of empirical contracts
scholarship, including studies on: clauses for liquidated damages in rental
agreements," transfer provisions in mortgages, 67 material adverse change
clauses in M&A deals," and a variety of terms in venture capital
fmancings.69 Empirical studies such as these have tended to view contracts
as collections of terms that include the term(s) of empirical interest.70
Recent empirical scholarship has started to adopt novel analytical
techniques, such as natural language processing, but has continued to take
a reductionist approach to contracts. 71

63

See

Gilson, supranote 46, at 254.
e.g., Lisa Bernstein, The Silicon Valley Lawyer as Transaction Cost Engineer?,
74 OR. L. REV. 239, 251-52 (1995) (applying Gilson's framework to transactional lawyers
working with startups and venture capital firms in Silicon Valley); see Marcel Kahan & Michael
Klausner, Standardizationand Innovation in Corporate Contracting, 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 736
(1997) (noting the traditional view that transactional lawyers add value by helping the parties
identify the set of terms that maximize their joint value).
"sSee Elisabeth de Fontenay, Law Firm Selection and the Value of Transactional
Lawyering, 41 J. CORP. L. 393, 396-97, 405-06 (2015).
"See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A
PsychologicalExperiment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 633, 633-38 (2010) (finding that parties are more
likely to exploit efficient breach opportunities if the contract contains a clause for liquidated
damages).
67
See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Breaching the Mortgage Contract: The Behavioral
Economics of Strategic Default, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1547, 1573-74 (2011) (finding that transfer
provisions in mortgage contracts can increase the likelihood of homeowners engaging in
strategic default).
68
See Robert T. Miller, The Economics of Deal Risk: Allocating Risk Through MAC
Clauses in Business CombinationAgreements, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2007, 2007-09 (2009)
(finding that material adverse change clauses typically allocate four types of risk: systematic
risk, indicator risk, agreement risk, and business risk).
69
See Spencer Williams, Venture CapitalContractDesign: An EmpiricalAnalysis ofthe
Connection Between BargainingPower and Venture FinancingContract Terms, 23 FORDHAM
J. CORP. & FIN. L. 105, 149-54 (2017) (finding that the total supply of venture capital financing
is statistically connected to numerous terms in venture capital contracts).
70
See id. at 158-59.
71
See, e.g., Robert Anderson & Jeffrey Manns, The Inefficient Evolution of Merger
Agreements, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 57, 64, 70-72, 80-83 (2017) (constructing "family trees"
of precedent documents to visualize how M&A terms change over time); see also Bernhard
Ganglmair & Malcom Wardlaw, Complexity, Standardization, and the Design of Loan

'See,
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While alluringly simple, contractual reductionism fails to properly
capture the complexity of contracts.7 2 This traditional term-by-term
approach overlooks the significance of macro-level effects and is
insufficient to understand a contract as a whole." Recent scholarship,
however, has begun to challenge contractual reductionism.74 This
scholarship is the subject of the next section.
B. ChallengingReductionism
A growing literature has begun to push back against contractual
reductionism. This new scholarship challenges the term-by-term,
reductionist approach traditionally taken by contract scholars. Thus far,
this
scholarship
has
focused
on
contractual
modularity,
multidimensionality, and structure.
The scholarship challenging contractual reductionism largely
started with Henry Smith's examination of the use of modularity in
contract design." Smith identified that interaction effects between terms
increase the complexity of the overall contract76 and that contractual
modularity can be used as a mechanism to respond to this complexity.77
According to Smith, by using modular terms with limited interactions with
other terms, a contract designer can limit the flow of information between
different segments of the contract, thereby reducing the contract's
complexity.78 Smith then analyzed the role of standardized boilerplate
terms, finding that the primary function of contractual boilerplate is to

manuscript),
2017)
(unpublished
5
(Apr.
13,
Agreements
(applying topic model text
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2952567
analysis to covenants in debt contracts); see also Elliott Ash, W. Betley MacLeod & Suresh
Naidu, Optimal ContractDesign in the Wild: Rigidity and Control in Collective Bargaining2
(Jan. 29, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://events.barcelonagse.eu/live/files/2366elliottash61103pdf (applying topic model text analysis to labor union contracts that the authors
describe as "bundles of obligations and entitlements"). See infra Section III.C. (discussing legal
technology and natural language processing).
"See Hwang & Jennejohn, supra note 2, at 282-84, 296.
"See Hwang & Jennejohn, supra note 2, at 282-84, 296.
"See infra Section II.B.
"See Smith, supra note 9, at 1176, 1179-80, 1187-99; see also Radin, supra note 9, at
1224 (conducting early work on contractual modularity, and continuing to take a reductionist
approach to contracts, describing legal modularity as "the practice of creating a legal document
by selecting and cobbling together terms from a source compendium or from different sources").
76
See Smith, supra note 9, at 1189-90 (discussing how cross-references, dependent
covenants, and definitions create interaction effects between terms).
"See Smith, supra note 9, at 1189-90
"See Smith, supra note 9, at 1189-90; see also Triantis, supra note 9, at 204-206
(proposing the use of technology to enhance the benefits of modularity by enabling multiple
contract designers to collaborate on terms via a centralized platform).
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increase the overall modularity of a contract. 79 In developing his theory of
modularity and boilerplate, Smith recognized a critical aspect of contract
design: a contract is more than just a collection of terms.80 In addition to
the effects of individual terms, the interaction effects between those terms
have significant implications for how the contract should be designed and
how it will function.
Albert Choi and George Triantis explored interaction effects in the
context of vague terms.', As part of the debate about the relative merits of
precise terms versus vague terms, Choi and Triantis argued that vague
terms can reduce moral hazard by creating a disincentive for ex post
litigation and can respond to adverse selection by incentivizing
information provision at the time of contracting and/or renegotiation., 2 In
order for vague terms to serve this function, however, the ratio of litigation
costs to damages needs to fall within a particular range.83 Parties can
control this ratio ex ante using liquidated damages clauses to specify
damages and dispute resolution provisions to limit litigation costs.84 As a
result, the cost-reducing function of vague terms is enabled in part by the
interaction between vague terms, liquidated damages clauses, and dispute
resolution provisions.Y
Cathy Hwang extended the concept of modularity to transactions
such as Merger and Acquisition ("M&A") deals that are effectuated by
using multiple interconnected contracts. 86 As Hwang describes, M&A
transactions are typically structured with a central acquisition agreement
that is connected to numerous ancillary agreements such as confidentiality
agreements, employment agreements, and intellectual property
assignments.87 Similar to Smith's discussion of interaction effects between
terms within a contract, Hwang discusses interaction effects between
contracts within a multi-contract transaction which she refers to as an
"unbundled bargain."" Hwang argues that one of the key benefits of

7 9See Smith, supra note 9, at 1196-99 (arguing that boilerplate terms contribute to
contractual modularity via decomposition, substitution, augmentation, exclusion, inversion, and
porting).
80
See Smith, supra note 9, at 1196-99.
"See Choi & Triantis, supranote 10, at 848, 852-55, 859-60, 921-24.
"2See id. at 852-55, 859-60.
"See id. at 921 ("Nevertheless, to achieve this screening, verification cost can be neither
too large nor too small compared to the size of the litigation stake. If the litigation cost is too
large, no seller will have a credible claim against the buyer; whereas if the litigation cost is too
low, all sellers will bring a lawsuit against the buyer.").
84
See id. at 921-24.
"See Choi & Triantis, supranote 10, at 921-24.
86
See Hwang, supra note 11, at 1403-27.
87
See id. at 1410-17.
88

Id.
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simplifying a complex deal into multiple contracts is to take advantage of
modularity." For example, deal modularity enables specialists such as
employment or intellectual property lawyers to focus on a particular part
of the transaction in need of their expertise while having a limited effect
on the overall structure of the deal."0 Through her analysis of unbundled
bargains, Hwang further advances a view of contracts in which interaction
effects and structure matter. 91
Similar to Hwang's investigation of deal modularity, Matthew
Jennejohn examined the multidimensionality of contracts through a
theoretical and empirical analysis of interfirm innovation alliance
contracts. 92 Jennejohn proposes a theory of "multivalent" contracting in
which contract designers use a variety of contractual mechanisms to
respond to a variety of transaction costs.93 According to Jennejohn,
contract terms function in an integrated fashion to address the
multidimensional set of challenges faced by the parties.9 While certain
terms are primarily intended to respond to specific transaction costs, others
95
work in tandem and influence one another. As a result, changes to one
term to improve its functioning may impact the ability of another term to
do its job.6 Contrary to traditional contractual reductionism, Jennejohn's
integrated approach to contract design views contracts as greater than the
sum of their terms. 97
Most recently, Hwang and Jennejohn collaborated on a research
9
project examining the importance of contract structure. The authors argue
that the increasingly complex and interconnected nature of contracts
99
necessitates a macro-level analysis of contract structure. They propose a
theory of "contractual structuralism," which they define as the "idea that
how a contract is put together matters in every part of that contract's life

9

Id

at 1417-27.

'See Hwang, supra note 11, at 1418-23.
91

See id. at 1418-23.
See Jennejohn, supra note 12, at 284-94.
93
1d. at 323.
94
1d. ("Parties not only have to navigate more than one type of transaction[.]").
95
Id.at 323-26.
96
See Jennejohn, supra note 12, at 326 ("[G]overnance mechanisms are interdependent.
A contract provision that addresses holdup problems may also affect, either positively or
negatively, the mitigation of spillover and/or entropy concerns. ").
97
Idat 292.
9
"See Hwang & Jennejohn, supra note 2, at 281.
"See Hwang & Jennejohn, supra note 2, at 296 ("[A]s the core parts of the deal are
increasingly memorialized in multiple related contract provisions, or even in multiple related
documents, moving beyond a provision-by-provision study, and into a macro-level study of
contract structure, is increasingly important.").
92
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cycle: design, performance, and enforcement."100 The authors identify
three primary categories of contract structure (modular, integrated, and
hybrid) and provide examples of each."" The primary claim of their work
is that it is critical for lawyers designing contracts and judges interpreting
contracts to understand whether a contract is modular, integrated, or
hybrid before engaging in term-level analysis.0 2 This claim emphasizes
the importance of the contractual whole and stands in stark contrast with
contractual reductionism.103
A recurring theme throughout these works is that contracts are more
complex than their individual terms would suggest. Fortunately, there is a
field of study dedicated to understanding systems composed of numerous
interacting components: complex systems theory.1" While these works
have implicated the systemic nature of contracts, 05 none have fully
addressed contracts as systems. To fill this gap, this Article provides the
first application of complex systems theory to contracts. This is the subject
of the next section.
III. CONTRACTS AS SYSTEMS

This section applies complex systems theory to contracts to argue
that a contract is a complex system that is greater than the sum of its terms.
Section III.A provides a brief overview of complex systems theory.
Section III.B uses complex systems theory to model a contract as a
complex system. Section III.C uses this model to discuss key properties of
complex systems that are exhibited by contract systems.
A. Complex Systems Theory
Complex systems theory is an interdisciplinary field of study that
examines the behaviors and properties of complex systems. 106 Complex
00

' See Hwang & Jennejohn, supra note 2, at 284.
0

' 'See Hwang & Jennejohn, supra note 2, at 299-321. Examples of contracts with

modular structure include OTC derivatives, supply chain contracts, and securities offerings.
Examples of contracts with integrated structure include relational contracts and interfirm
innovation alliance contracts. M&A deals are the primary example of contracts with hybrid

structure.

02
' See Hwang & Jennejohn, supra note 2, at 320-21.
03

' See Hwang & Jennejohn, supra note 2, at 320-21.
""See infra Section III.A.
'See Smith, supra note 9, at 1180, 1184-85; see Jennejohn, supra note 12, at 321-22,
364; see also Hwang & Jennejohn, supra note 2, at 299-301.
106See JOHNSON, supranote 39, at 17 (noting that complex systems theory "looks at the
complicated and surprising things which can emerge from the interaction of a collection of
objects which themselves may be rather simple"); see generally MELANIE MITCHELL,

232

DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW

Vol. 45

systems theory originated at the intersection of physics, biology, and
computer science,"1 and has since made its way to the social sciences.Os
The genesis of complex systems theory was an effort to explain systems
that could not be properly explained by traditional scientific
reductionism,", much in the way that this Article seeks to expand the
understanding of contracts beyond contractual reductionism. The primary
goal of complex systems theory is to understand "how parts of a system
and their relationships give rise to the collective behaviors of the system,
and how the system interrelates with its environment.""0 The central theme
running throughout this field is that a system is greater than the sum of its
parts."1 This theme is exemplified by the title of Nobel Laureate Phil
Anderson's famous article: More is Different - systems with a large
number of interacting components are not merely larger, they are
fundamentally different."2
One of the biggest unresolved questions in complex systems theory
may also seem like one of the most basic questions for a field dedicated to
studying complex systems: "What is a complex system?""3 Some scholars
of complex systems have focused their definitions on the connections
between the components of the system.' '4 Others have focused on the
collective behavior of the components that emerges at the system level.1'

&

COMPLEXITY: A GUIDED TOUR 4 (2011); see generally STEFAN THURNER, RUDOLF HANEL
PETER KLIMEK, INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS v. (2018); see

generally David C. Krakauer, Complexity: Worlds Hidden in Plain Sight, in WORLDS HIDDEN
IN PLAIN SIGHT 229 (David C. Krakauer ed., 2019) ("Complexity science is an effort to discern
and theorize common patterns in complex systems from multiple scientific perspectives.").
Complex systems theory is commonly referred to by other names such as systems theory,
complexity theory, or complexity science.
107See MITCHELL, supra note 106, at 16-22 (discussing the history of complex systems
theory).
"'See, e.g., MILLER & PAGE, supra note 39, at 3-8 (introducing their book on
computational modeling for complex social systems).
'0See JOHNSON, supra note 39, at 17; see also MILLER & PAGE, supra note 39, at 3, 10,
27.
"0Y. Bar-Yam, General Features of Complex Systems, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LIFE
SUPPORT SYSTEMS 1 (2002).
1"See DONELLA H. MEADOWS, THINKING IN SYSTEMS 12 (2008); see GEOFFREY
WEST, SCALE: THE UNIVERSAL LAWS OF LIFE, GROWTH, AND DEATH IN ORGANISMS, CITIES,
AND COMPANIES 21-23 (2017).
2

P. W. Anderson, More is Different, 177 SCIENCE 393 (1972) (arguing against the
widespread acceptance of reductionism in the natural sciences).
" 3See MEADOWS, supra note 111, at 11.
" 4See, e.g., MEADOWS, supra note 111, at 11 (defining a complex system as "an
interconnected set of elements that is coherently organized in a way that achieves something").
1

5

" See,

e.g., STEVEN JOHNSON, EMERGENCE: THE CONNECTED LIVES OF ANTS,

BRAINS, CITIES, AND SOFTWARE 18 (2002) (defining a complex system as a system in which
"agents residing on one scale start producing behavior that lies one scale above them"); see
MITCHELL, supra note 106, at 13 (defining a complex system as "a system in which large
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Still, others have taken a mathematically-oriented approach to defining a
complex system. 6 After many years and many definitions, the most
generally applicable definition likely remains the one provided by Nobel
Laureate Herbert Simon in 1962: a complex system is "made up of a large
number of parts that interact in a nonsimple way."" 7
Complex systems theory is closely related to network theory."' A
network is a mechanism for representing how a collection of elements
relate to one another." 9 A common example of a network is a route map
for an airline. 120 The cities in the airline's route network are represented as
dots on the map (called "nodes") and the flights are represented as lines
between the dots (called "links"). 12 For example, a network would
represent an airline's flight path from New York City to Los Angeles as a
link between the New York City node and the Los Angeles node.
Networks can be used to represent a wide variety of relational information,
including social connections between friends (a social network),
transactional connections between financial institutions (a financial
network), and disease transmission connections between infected
individuals (an epidemiological network). Networks are particularly
useful for analyzing complex systems because they can be used to
represent the interactions between the components in a system.12 2
While complex systems theory has existed as a distinct field of study
for multiple decades, it has seen a recent resurgence due to advances in

networks of components ... give rise to complex collective behavior"); see WEST, supra note
111, at 21 (defining a complex system as a system that "is composed of myriad individual
constituents or agents that once aggregated take on collective characteristics that are usually not
manifested in, nor could easily be predicted from, the properties of the individual components
themselves"); see DANIEL B. LARREMORE & AARON CLAUSET, WHY PREDICTING THE FUTURE
Is MORE THAN JUST HORSEPLAY, WORLDS HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT 340 (David C. Krakauer

ed., 2019) (defining a complex system as a system "with many interacting elements whose
collective behavior defies expectations based on their component parts").
"'See, e.g., THURNER ET AL., supra note 106, at 22 (defining a complex system as a
"co-evolving multilayer network"). See infra Section III.B. (basing its formal model of a contract
system on this definition).
7
" Herbert A. Simon, The Architecture of Complexity, 106 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC'Y 467,
468 (1962).
" 8 See JOHNSON, supranote 39, at 97-110; see MILLER & PAGE, supra note 39, at 15465; see MITCHELL, supra note 106, at 227-57; see THURNER ET AL., supranote 106, at 140-223.
See infra Section IIB. (featuring networks prominently in this Article's modeling of a contract
as a complex system).
9
" THURNER ET AL., supra note 106, at 140 ("Networks are a tool for keeping track of
who is interacting with whom, at what strength, when, and in what way.").
20
1 See MITCHELL, supra note 106, at 229-30.
2
1' See MITCHELL, supra note 106, at 229-30.
2
1 See THURNER ET AL., supra note 106, at 140.
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computational power and data collection.123 Increased computing power
and new analytical techniques, including statistical machine learning, are
enabling scholars to quantitatively examine systems that were previously
too complex for meaningful computational analysis.14 Furthermore,
substantially improved data collection mechanisms have provided
researchers with the information needed to model real-world complex
systems with a high level of granularity and accuracy. 25 These advances
have led some systems experts to suggest the possibility of a quantitative
science of complexity.'2 6 Experts have cautioned, however, that any such
quantitative approach must be properly informed by a cohesive theory of
complex systems. 27
Over the years, complex system theory has been used to examine
numerous different complex systems across a wide variety of contexts.
Within the life sciences, complex systems theory has been applied to
systems such as living cells,,2 insect colonies,129 the human brain,"' and
the immune system.13 As for the social sciences, complex systems
researchers have studied systems as varied as cities, 2 transportation
systems,3 romantic relationships,14 and war.' Complex systems theory
36
has been particularly useful for studying economics and finance,1 as well
as technology systems.13 One of the key findings of complex systems
theory is that complex systems exhibit a surprising degree of similarity

' 2 3See MILLER & PAGE, supra note 39, at 26-27; see WEST, supra note 111, at 22-23;
see generally THURNER ET AL., supranote 106, at v., 25-26.
4
11 See THURNER ET AL., supra note 106, at vi., 25-26.
2
1' See THURNER ET AL., supra note 106, at vi., 25-26.
126See WEST, supra note 111, at 427, 440-48.
'7See WEST, supra note 111, at 427, 440-48.
' 28See JOHNSON, supra note 115, at 82-86.
129See MITCHELL, supra note 106, at 4-5.
'See MITCHELL, supra note 106, at 4-5.
"'See MITCHELL, supra note 106, at 6-9.
' 2See JOHNSON, supra note 115, 87-97.
"'SeeJOHNSON, supra note 39, at 129-45.
' 34See JOHNSON, supra note 39, at 147-58.
1'3 See JOHNSON, supra note 39, at 159-76.
1 36See JOHNSON, supra, note 39, at 113-27 (applying complex systems theory to
financial markets); see W. Brian Arthur, Complexity: A Different Way to Look at the Economy,
in WORLDS HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT 193-99 (David C. Krakauer ed., 2019) (discussing
complexity economics); see also John H. Miller, What Happens When the Systems We Rely on
Go Haywire?, in WORLDS HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT 311-15 (David C. Krakauer ed., 2019)
(applying complex systems theory to algorithmic trading).
' 7See JOHNSON, supra note 115, at 115-26 (describing the internet as a complex
system); see also Seth Blumsack, How Complexity Science Can Help Keep the Lights On, in
WORLDS HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT 329-337 (David C. Krakauer ed., 2019) (applying complex
systems theory to electric grid management).
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and common behavior across diverse contexts.3 ' This Article examines
key properties of complex systems that are exhibited by contract systems
in Section III.C.
Despite being applied to a variety of fields, complex systems theory
remains relatively underexplored in legal scholarship. The application of
complex systems theory to the law has primarily been limited by scholars
to three areas of inquiry. First, scholars have examined the role of the law
as a component of a broader social system. 39 Second, scholars have framed
the entire legal system as a complex system.14 , Third, scholars have
analyzed the presence of systemic complexity in the law.14 Complex
systems theory has notably been missing from contract and business law,
though recent research is starting to change this trend.142 This Article uses
complex systems theory to argue that a contract is as a complex system
that is greater than the sum of its terms. This is the subject of the next
section.
B. Modeling a Contract as a Complex System
A contract is a complex system composed of terms and interactions
between terms.1 43 It exists within an environment that contains external
conditions such as contract law and norms. A contract system can be

.38See JOHNSON, supra note 39, at 13-17; see MILLER & PAGE, supra note 39, at 230;
see MITCHELL, supra note 106, at 12-13; see THURNER ET AL., supra note 106, at v.

1 39See generally J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigmfor the Dynamical Lawand-Society System: A Wake-Up Callfor Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative
State, 45 DUKE L. J. 849 (1996) [hereinafter Ruhl, Complexity Theory]; see J.B. Ruhl, The
Fitness ofLaw: Using Complexity Theory to Describethe Evolution of Law and Society andIts
Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407 (1996) [hereinafter Ruhl, The
Fitness of Law]; see also NIKLAS LUHMANN, LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM (FATIMA KASTNER,
ET AL. EDS., KLAUS A. ZIEGERT TRANS., OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2004).
"*See generally Gerald J. Postema, Law's System: The Necessity of System in Common
Law, 2014 N.Z. L. REV. 69 (2014); see also Brian Tamanaha, Law's Evolving Emergent
Phenomena: From Rules of Social Intercourse to Rule of Law Society, 95 WASH. U. L. REV.
1149 (2018).
41
See generally Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and
Cures, 42 DUKE L. J. 1 (1992); see generally R. G. Wright, The Illusion of Simplicity: An
Explanation of Why the Law Can'tJust Be Less Complex, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 715 (2000).
'4 2See, e.g., Tamara Belinfanti & Lynn Stout, Contested Visions: The Value ofSystems
Theory for CorporateLaw, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 581-86 (applying complex systems theory
to corporations and corporate law); see also Hilary J. Allen, Payments Failure, B.C. L. Rev.
(forthcoming
2020)
(manuscript
at
10
21),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cftn?abstract-id=3539797
(applying complex systems
theory to the regulation of systemic risk in payments systems).
14 3Practically all real-world contracts studied by contract scholars meet the definition of
a complex system. An example of a contract that is not a complex system is a simple agreement
between friends in which one friend agrees to mow the other friend's lawn for $50.
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represented as a coevolving multilayer network in which the terms and the
interactions between terms evolve over time in tandem.'4 This section
models this representation of a contract system using concepts drawn from
complex systems theory to provide a framework for understanding and
analyzing a contract as a complex system. This model is then used as the
basis for discussing key properties of a contract system in Section III.C
and the implications of a complex systems approach to contracts in Section
III. The components of the model are: (1) the contract terms, (2) the
interactions between terms, (3) the manner in which the terms and
interactions evolve over time, and (4) the environment in which the
contract system exists. These components are discussed in the sections
below. A formal presentation of the model is provided in the Appendix.
1. Terms
The first step in modeling a contract as a complex system is to
represent each of the contract's terms as components of the overall contract
system. For example, the force majeure clause is a common component of
modern contract systems. To enable quantitative analysis of a contract
system, each term is represented in the model by a function that provides
information about the term at a particular point in time. These functions
are referred to throughout the remainder of this Article as "state functions"
because they indicate the "state" of the term in the system at a particular
point in time.
The state functions can take a variety of forms. A binary state
function, for example, simply represents whether the term is present in the
contract at a particular point in time, with the state function equal to one if
the term is present and zero if the term is not. A continuous state function,
on the other hand, can be used to represent a term that takes the form of a
real number, for example the price term in a sales contract or the interest
rate in a mortgage. If the interest rate of a variable rate mortgage (a type
of mortgage in which the interest rate fluctuates over time) was equal to
five percent in January 2020, then the continuous state function
representing the interest rate term would be equal to 0.05 in January 2020.
A categorical state function can be used to represent a term that takes one
of a limited number of forms, for example an antidilution provision in a
venture capital contract, which typically comes in one of three varieties:
full ratchet, broad-based weighted-average, or narrow-based weighted-

"This representation of a complex system and the model developed in this section draw
heavily on the concepts and notation used by Thurner, Hanel & Klimek. See THURNER ET AL.,
supra note 106, at 21-26.
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average. 4 Each of these different potential forms can be assigned a
number (e.g. one, two, and three, respectively). Then, for example, if a
venture capital contract uses the full ratchet version of antidilution, the
categorical state function representing the term would be equal to one.1 4 6
If a term can take multiple independent states at the same time, the state
function can take the form of a vector14 7 that represents each of the different
states simultaneously. For example, an interest rate term could be
represented as a vector that indicates the rate (continuous), whether the
interest is simple or compound (binary), and the accrual period
(categorical: daily, monthly, quarterly, or annually).
When applying this model to real-world contracts, one will need to
decide how to decompose the contract into terms. There are a number of
ways to do this. First, a contract can be broken down into terms based on
easily identifiable markers such as section/subsection headings and
numberings. Think of this as the "Table of Contents" approach. This
approach has been used in other contexts to decompose legal text into
components for network analysis.141 Second, contracts can be subdivided
into terms that are conceptually distinct, with each term addressing a
unique concept within the contract. Natural language processing is
particularly useful for breaking contracts down in this way, and there are
many legal technology companies currently taking this approach.149 Third,
a contract can be reduced to its constituent terms based on an existing
understanding of the common terms in the contract. For example, law
firms that deal with particular types of contracts on a repeat basis (such as
venture capital or M&A) often have internal lists of the terms that make
up these contracts.150 In some instances, a term may be composed of several
"sub-terms." For example, antidilution provisions in venture capital
financing agreements are often written as a primary section containing an
antidilution formula along with subsections defining the variables used in
the formula.15 When modeling such a term, the user of the model will need

4

1 sSee Williams, supra note 69, at 131-32.

146See

id at 131.
147See THURNER ET AL., supra note 106, at 22 (describing a vector as a mathematical
tool that can be used to represent multidimensional data).
'See Adam B. Badawi & Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Reference Networks and Civil
Codes, in LAW AS DATA: COMPUTATION, TEXT, AND THE FUTURE OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 355-

56 (Michael A. Livermore & Daniel N. Rockmore eds., 2019).
'"See Williams, supra note 69, at 652-56. See infra Section III.C. (providing further
discussion of legal technology and natural language processing).
'See de Fontenay, supra note 65, at 397 (describing how large law firms compile
databases of deal terms).
51
' See Nat'l Venture Capital Ass'n, §4.4.4 Model Certificate of Incorporation (Sept.

2020), https://nvca.org/model-legal-documents.
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to decide whether to represent the term as a single term or as a connected
set of terms. 12 The benefit of breaking such terms down into their
constituent sub-terms is that doing so increases the granularity of the
model, but this comes at the cost of making the model more complicated.
Once the terms in the contract system have been represented in the
model by state functions, then next step in the model is to represent the
interactions between these terms.
2. Interactions
The terms in a contract system frequently interact with one another.
For example, the force majeure clause typically interacts with multiple
3
other terms, including definitions and risk allocation provisions." These
interactions are represented in the model by networks, with the terms as
the nodes and the interactions as the links between nodes. For example, a
simple contract with four terms, A, B, C, and D, in which term A interacts
with terms B and C, term B interacts with terms A, C, and D, term C
interacts with terms A and B, and term D interacts with term B, can be
represented by the following network:

A

C
B
D
As can be seen in the network above, the terms in the contract
system are represented as nodes in the network (the circles), and the
interactions between those terms are represented as links in the network
(the lines between circles). For example, terms A and B are linked because
they interact. On the other hand, terms C and D are not linked because they

'"Thankyou to Charlotte Alexander for this helpful point.
3
' See Robert M. Finkel, John A. Trenor & Ariel Soiffer, COVID-19: Drafting Force
Majeure Clauses in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic, WILMERHALE (Apr. 14, 2020),
https://www.wilmerhale.com/en/insights/client-alerts/20200413-drafting-force-maj eureclauses-in-light-of-the-covid-19-pandemic.
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do not interact.5' The Appendix discusses how the information contained
in an interaction network such as this can be represented in a form suitable
for quantitative analysis.
The network above assumes that if term A interacts with term B,
then term B necessarily interacts with term A. This network is an example
of an undirected network. An undirected network is a network in which
there is no direction to the interactions in the network.15' For example,
Facebook is an undirected social network because if person A is "friends"
with person B on Facebook, then person B is by definition friends with
person A. Certain types of interactions in a contract system, however, may
be directed. For example, if term A is a definition term that is used in term
B, then term A interacts with term B, but term B does not necessarily
interact with term A. A change in term A would affect term B, but a change
in term B would not necessarily affect term A. Directed networks are used
to represent directed interactions such as these. A directed network is a
network in which the interactions therein have direction. 156 For example,
Twitter is a directed social network because person A can "follow" person
B without person B following person A. The following is a directed
network for a contract in which term A interacts with terms B and C, term
B interacts with term D, term C does not interact with any other terms, and
term D interacts with term B:

A

C

B
D
As can be seen in the network above, the interactions in the network
have direction (represented by the arrows at the end of the links). For
example, an arrow points from term A to term C because term A interacts
with term C, but there is no arrow pointing from term C to term A because
term C does not interact with term A. On the other hand, the link between

"'Terms C and D do not directly interact and therefore are not directly linked in the
network. They both interact, however, with term B and are therefore indirectly linked. See infra
Section II.C.6. (providing further discussion of the potential effects of a series of linked terms).
155
See THURNER ET AL., supra note 106, at 145.
156
See THURNER ET AL., supra note 106, at 145.
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terms B and D have an arrow on each end because term B interacts with
term D and term D interacts with term B.
Thus far, the networks above have merely represented whether an
interaction is present between two terms. These networks are examples of
unweighted networks. An unweighted network is a network in which the
interactions in the network do not have magnitude (commonly referred to
as "weight") - they either exist or they do not.'? An example of an
unweighted network is an airline route map that simply shows whether the
airline has a flight path between two cities. Some types of interactions,
however, may come in different strengths. Weighted networks are used to
represent interactions such as these. A weighted network is one in which
the interactions in the network have magnitude.-s An example of a
weighted network is an airline route map that shows whether the airline
has a flight path between two cities, and if so, the number of daily flights
between those cities. Interactions in a contract network can sometimes be
weighted. For example, a "late fee" provision in a consumer contract may
increase the amount the consumer owes under the payment obligation
provision by five percent if payment is thirty days late versus ten percent
if payment is sixty days late. The following is a weighted, directed network
for a contract in which term A interacts strongly with term B and weakly
with term C, term B interacts strongly with term D, term C does not
interact with any terms, and term D interacts strongly with term B:

B
D
In the network above, a solid line represents a strong interaction
whereas a dashed line represents a weak interaction.
Most contract systems will have multiple different types of
interactions, such as textual cross references (e.g. Section 3.4 explicitly
references Section 2.8), linked definitions, conceptual interactions, and
dependent promises.- 9 In this model, each type of interaction is
represented as a separate network that indicates all the interactions of that

'See THURNER ET AL., supra note 106, at 150.
"'See THURNER ET AL., supra note 106, at 150.
59

' See Smith, supra note 9, at 1188-90.
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type between the terms at a given point in time. Together, the networks
representing all the interaction types in the contract system make up the
contractual multilayer network. The following is a multilayer network for
a contract in which terms A and B have an undirected, unweighted
dependent promise interaction, term B has a directed, unweighted
definition interaction with term D, and terms C and D do not interact with
any other terms.

Dependent Promises

Definitions

A

B

B

o

D

As can be seen above, the two different types of interactions in the
contract system are each represented by a network. The combined
multilayer network represents all interactions in the contract system. Once
the terms and interactions in the contract system have been represented in
the model, the next step in the model is to represent the system's
environment.
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3. Environment
A contract system does not exist within a vacuum. Rather, it exists
within an environment that contains external conditions' such as contract
law, norms, industry standards, relationships, other contracts, economic
conditions, and other areas of law. The following diagram depicts a
contract system within its environment:

Contract
Law
Other
Law
Economic
Conditions

Other
Contracts

Contract
Norms
Contract
System

Industry
Standards

Contract
Relationships

As can be seen in the diagram above, the contract system is an open
system 6' that is influenced by its environment (represented by the arrows
going into the system) and that influences its environment (represented by
the arrows going out of the system). Some relationships between the
system and its environment are unidirectional whereas others are
bidirectional. An example of a unidirectional relationship is general
economic conditions. General economic conditions can affect the terms of
a contract, but the contract is unlikely to have a material effect on general
economic conditions. For example, the fluctuation of overall interest rates
can affect the interest rate term in a variable rate mortgage, but the
mortgage is unlikely to affect overall interest rates. An example of a
bidirectional relationship is the interaction between the contract system

16See Williams, supra note 45, at 646-47 (discussing exogenous conditions that
influence contract terms and outcomes). For example, the Uniform Commercial Code situates a
contract within an environment containing usage of trade, course of dealing, and course of
performance. See Hwang & Jennejohn, supra note 2, at 313.
"'An open system is a system that interacts with its environment. This is contrasted
with a closed system, which does not. Most real-world systems are open systems to some extent.
See MEADOWS, supra note 111, at 95-99; see JOHNSON, supra note 39, at 14; see Jennejohn,
supra note 12, at 364 ("[C]ontract law is only one node in a broader enforcement network. In
other words, the legal infrastructure supporting collaboration is an open system.").
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and contract law. For example, if a contract is litigated and results in a
judicial opinion that interprets the contract while also establishing
precedent with respect to the issue at hand, the contract will have been
influenced by the law and the law will have been influenced by the
contract.
One of the key determinations to make when analyzing a complex
system is where to establish the boundary between the system and its
environment.162 In the diagram above, the boundary is represented by the
dashed circle surrounding the contract system. The boundary serves as an
analytical tool for defining which elements are part of the system and
which elements are part of the environment.163 In this case, the system to
be analyzed is the "contract"-the contractual relationship between the
parties likely memorialized in a text-based document. If, however, one
wanted to analyze a broader system composed of multiple contracts,
contract law, contract norms, and contract relationships, one could
reconceptualize the boundary between this new system and its
environment.1" The following diagram depicts this new arrangement:

Other
Law

Industry
Standards

'-Contracts

'

Contract
Law

Contract
Norms

;
;

Contract

Relationships

Economic
Conditions
As can be seen in the diagram above, the expanded boundary now
includes additional elements in the system. These additional elements

2

111, at 95-99.
supra note 111, at 95-99.
1
"See Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding:The Interaction
of Formal and Informal Contractingin Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
1377, 1379-87. (proposing a theory of contractual "braiding" in which formal and informal
contracting function in tandem).
" See MEADOWS, supra note

163See MEADOWS,
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(extra contracts, contract law, norms, and relationships) can be represented
in the model by their own sets of state functions and interaction networks.
For example, rules and principles of contract law can be represented by
additional state functions. The interactions of these rules and principles,
both with each other and with other elements in the system, can be
represented by additional interaction networks in the system's multilayer
network. While it may seem analytically appealing to include every
potentially relevant factor in the system, such a system will quickly
become unwieldy.6 , Furthermore, when applying this model to real-world
contract systems, the larger the system, the more data necessary to
properly construct the model.'" As a result, it will often be necessary to
limit the scope of the system for purposes of analysis and modeling.
Once the contract system and its environment have been represented
in the model, the final step in the model is to represent how the system
changes over time.167
4. Evolution
The terms and the interactions in a contract system change over
time. Evolution of the contract system can occur for a variety of reasons,
including modification, renegotiation, waiver, interpretation, and
redrafting.'" For example, the parties to a contract may disagree over a
particular term and resolve their disagreement via a formal contract
modification that alters the form of the disputed term. As a result of this
contract modification, the state function representing the term would
change to reflect the modified form of the term. Furthermore, the
modification may also affect interactions between the modified term and
other terms, and as a result the interaction networks representing these
interactions would change as well. Conditions out of the control of the

'6 5See MEADOWS, supra note 111, at 98.
'See Williams, supra note 45, at 686-87 (discussing how more complicated models
typically require more data).
167Although this model has been constructed to account for change in a contract system
over time, the model can also be used to analyze a contract system at a particular point in time.
"'There is a rich literature on the evolution of contract terms. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi
& G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in BoilerplateContracts:An Empirical Examination of Sovereign
Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929, 933-36 (2004) (discussing how adverse judicial interpretations can
lead to changes in steady state contract terms and providing empirical evidence from sovereign
debt contracts); see also Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, The Dynamics of
ContractEvolution, 88 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 7-10, 27, 35-36 (2013) (proposing and testing a threestage model of contract evolution that includes pre-interpretation standardization, postinterpretation innovation, and post-innovation standardization); see also Anderson & Manns,
supra note 71, at 76-80 (constructing "family trees" of precedent documents to visualize how
M&A terms change over time).
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parties can also cause a contract system to change. For example, in the
wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, many transactional lawyers are
changing how they draft force majeure clauses to properly protect their
clients in the event of a future pandemic that brings the global economy to
a halt.1 69 The state function representing the force majeure clause in a
contract system and any interaction networks that include the clause would
change as a result of the pandemic.
The model accounts for the evolution of terms and interactions over
time using evolution functions. Each term in the contract system has an
evolution function that describes how the term's respective state function
changes over time. For example, assume a term is present in a contract
system in 2020, but the transactional lawyer who drafts the contract
removes the term in a subsequent version of the contract in 2021. If the
term is represented in the model by a binary state function, then the
evolution function for the term would describe how the term's binary state
function changed from a value of one in 2020 (because the term was
present in the contract) to a value of zero in 2021 (because the term is no
longer present in the contract). The change in a term from one point in
time to another can depend in part on the state of the term, the state of
other terms, the state of interaction networks, and/or environmental
conditions. As a result, the evolution function of a term takes these
parameters into account.
Similarly, each interaction network in the contract system also has
an evolution function that describes how the network changes over time.
For example, assume terms A and B are linked in a contract system via a
textual cross reference in 2020, but the transactional lawyer who drafts the
contract removes the cross reference in a subsequent version of the
contract in 2021. The evolution function for the interaction network
representing textual cross references in the contract would describe how
the link between terms A and B was removed from the network between
2020 and 2021. As is the case with the term evolution functions, the
evolution functions for the interaction networks also take into account the
states of the terms, interaction networks, and environmental conditions.
Therefore, the evolution of the terms is influenced by the interaction
networks and the evolution of the interaction networks is influenced by the
terms. As a result, the terms and interactions in a contract system can be
said to "coevolve" - they evolve over time in tandem, each influencing the
evolution of the other.
To model the evolution of real-world contract systems, one would
need to specify the forms of the evolution functions for each term and
169See Finkel et al., supra note 153.
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interaction in the system. While doing so is beyond the scope of this
Article, the advent of technologies such as contract management systems
that track contract data over time have made this type of modeling
possible.170 With sufficient data on contract terms, interactions, and
environmental conditions, one could determine the set of evolution
functions for a particular contract system (e.g., a law firm's venture
financing contracts) and use these functions in combination with contract
data to engage in predictive analysis.m17 For example, past data on how a
contract system responded to an adverse judicial interpretation could be
used to specify evolution functions that would provide insight into how
the current system would respond to a future adverse interpretation.172

The model developed in this Section describes the terms,
interactions, environment, and evolution of a contract system. This model
provides a framework for thinking about contracts as systems. In the next
section, this Article uses the model to discuss a number of key complex
systems properties that are exhibited by contract systems.
C. Propertiesof a ContractSystem
Contract systems exhibit many key properties observed in other
complex systems. The sections below discuss the following properties of
a contract system: (1) organized complexity, (2) hierarchy, (3) emergence,
(4) adaptation, (5) sensitivity to initial conditions, (6) nonlinearity, and (7)
punctuated equilibria.
1. Organized Complexity
Complex systems are, by their very nature, complex. While the
standard meaning of "complex" is effectively the same as "complicated,"
17 3
complexity has a technical meaning within complex systems theory.

170

See Williams, supra note 45, at 648-61 (describing sources of contract data including
contract management systems, natural language processing, and computable contracts).
17 1
See THURNER ET AL., supra note 106, at 25.
172
See Williams, supra note 45, at 631-34 (proposing "predictive contracting" in which
machine learning systems statistically connect contract terms to contract outcomes). See infra
Section III.C. (providing further discussion of the implications of a complex systems approach
to contracts for legal technology).
173
See MILLER & PAGE, supra note 39, at 9, 27 (distinguishing between complex and
complicated); see THURNER ET AL., supra note 106, at v. (distinguishing between complex and
complicated). Although complexity and complicatedness are distinct, they tend to be positively
correlated in complex systems.
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When analyzing a complex system, complexity specifically refers to the
degree of interaction between the components of the system.' 4 The greater
the interactivity of the system, the greater the complexity.17, As identified
by Warren Weaver in 1948, complexity can come in two varieties:
disorganized and organized.176 Disorganized complexity arises from a very
large number of components interacting in a random, yet statistically
predictable manner.1 77 The random interactions that produce disorganized
complexity typically conform to the Law of Large Numbers, and as a result
their behavior can be described and modeled using probability and
statistics.178 An example of disorganized complexity is the behavior of
molecules in a gas. 179 Organized complexity, on the other hand, arises from
components interacting in a nonrandom (or at least not entirely random),
systematized fashion.80 As a result, organized complexity cannot be
modeled using traditional probability and statistics, but instead must be
analyzed using alternative methods such as network analysis.' Examples
of organized complexity include traffic jams, stock market crashes, and
earthquakes. 12 Complex systems theory is primarily concerned with
systems that exhibit organized complexity. 3
Interactions between terms within a contract system, as well as
interactions between terms and environmental conditions (such as contract
law), are typically nonrandom. Yet not all terms within a contract system
contribute equally to the complexity of the system. The greater the number
of other terms that a particular term interacts with, the greater the
complexity contributed by that term. Some terms will contribute very little
complexity. For example, a simple term listing the contact information of
the parties is unlikely to interact in a meaningful way with many other
terms. On the other hand, terms such as key definitions that interact with

74

See Bar-Yam, supra note 110, at 28; see MILLER & PAGE, supra note 39, at 9; see
MITCHELL, supra note 106, at 233.
175See Bar-Yam, supra note 110, at 28.
'7 6See Warren Weaver, Science and Complexity, 36 AMERICAN SCIENTIST 1, 2-7 (1948)
(describing and distinguishing between disorganized and organized complexity).
177See Weaver, supra note 176, at 538; see JOHNSON, supranote 115, at 46; see MILLER
& PAGE, supra note 39, at 47-48.
'"See MILLER & PAGE, supra note 39, at 47-48 ("[T]he Law of Large Numbers ...
provides some relatively general conditions under which a certain type of aggregate behavior
can emerge from the stochastic, microlevel actions of individual agents.").
179See JOHNSON, supranote 115, at 46.
80
See Weaver, supra note 176, at 4-7; see JOHNSON, supra note 115, at 47-49; see
MILLER & PAGE, supra note 39, at 49-50.
81
See MILLER & PAGE, supra note 39, at 47-48.
82
1 See MILLER & PAGE, supra note 39, at 50.
83
1 See Weaver, supra note 176, at 4-7; see JOHNSON, supra note 115, at 47-49; see
MILLER & PAGE, supra note 39, at 49-50.
1
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a large number of other terms will contribute a lot of complexity.
Contractual modularity can reduce the complexity of a contract system by
creating term "modules" in which the modular terms primarily interact
with each other rather than the rest of the system.184 In addition, certain
terms can substantially reduce the complexity of a system by limiting the
interaction of the system with parts of its environment.8 " For example, an
integration clause typically prevents a court from examining parol
evidence when interpreting a contract. In doing so, the integration clause
is cutting off interaction between the contract system and parol evidence
in its environment in the context of interpretation. As a result, the
integration clause reduces the complexity of the contract during
interpretation.
Discussion of complexity in legal scholarship has tended to view
complexity as a measure of complicatedness rather than interaction.1"' In
the context of contracts, empirical analysis of contractual complexity has
typically proxied complexity either by the length", or linguistic
complexity" of the contract. While length is positively correlated with
complexity (because longer contracts have more terms and more terms
tend to create more interactions), it is a rough proxy at best. 8 , A better
measure of contractual complexity would capture the degree of interaction
in the contract system.1w One such measure is the total complexity of the
contract: the total number of interactions across all interaction networks in
the contract."' This measure of complexity tends to increase as the number
of terms (i.e., the length of the contract) increases. 92 An alternative

"'SeeSmith, supra note 9, at 1180.
'See Smith, supra note 9, at 1180.
186See, e.g., Karen Eggleston, Eric A. Posner & Richard Zeckhauser, The Design and
Interpretation of Contracts: Why Complexity Matters, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 91, 97 (2000)
(proposing a three-part definition of contractual complexity, including "the cognitive load
required to understand the contract"); see also Wright, supra note 141, at 720 (equating legal
complexity with complicatedness).
17 See, e.g., John C. Coates, IV, Why Have M&A Contracts Grown? Evidence from
Twenty Years ofDeals 1 (Harvard Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Working
Paper No. 333, 2016) (analyzing the growth in complexity of M&A contracts over time based
on word count); see Ganglmair & Wardlaw, supra note 71, at 4-6 (analyzing the complexity of
debt contracts based on length).
88
' See, e.g., Coates, supra note 187, at 1 (analyzing the growth in complexity of M&A
contracts over time based on the Flesch-Kincaid linguistic complexity score); see Jeremy
McClane, Boilerplateand the Impact ofDisclosurein Securities Dealmaking, 72 VAND. L. REv.
191, 238-42 (2019) (analyzing the complexity of securities disclosures based on the Gunning
Fog readability index).
89
' See Smith, supra note 9, at 1213.
190See infra Appendix B.
"'See infra Appendix B.
'2See infra Appendix B.
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measure is the average complexity of the contract: the average number of
interactions per term. 93 This measure does not necessarily increase with
length. Another alternative for measuring complexity is the complexity
density of the contract: the percentage of total possible interactions present
in the contract. 1 4 This measure also does not necessarily increase with
length. The Appendix provides equations for calculating each of these
measures of complexity.
2. Hierarchy

'

'

Complex systems typically exhibit hierarchical structure, in which
a system is composed of subsystems that are themselves complex systems,
and these subsystems are in turn composed of even smaller subsystems,
until the system is reduced to its most basic, non-system components.1
Hierarchy is one of the most fundamental properties of complex systems
and is evident in physical, biological, social, and technological systems.
For example, humans are complex systems that are composed of organ
systems that are in turn composed of individual cells.1" Similarly, the
global economy is composed of national economies that are composed of
regional economies that are composed of local economies that are
composed of firms and individuals engaging in economic activity.' As a
result of hierarchy, complex systems can be viewed as having "levels," in
which lower level systems are components of higher level systems.199
Complex systems benefit from hierarchy through increased stability and
resilience as well as a reduction in the amount of information processing
that has to be handled by any one part of the system. 200
Like other complex systems, contract systems are hierarchical.2i A
network of interrelated contracts is composed of individual contracts, each
of which is a complex system. In a hierarchical contract system, individual
terms within individual contracts function as the lowest level, non-system

'See infra Appendix B.
' See infra Appendix B.
"See Simon, supra note 117, at 468 (describing the hierarchical structure of a complex
system as "a system that is composed of interrelated subsystems, each of the latter being, in turn,
hierarchic in structure until we reach some lowest level of elementary subsystem"); see
MEADOWS, supra note Il1, at 82-85; see MITCHELL, supra note 106, at 109; see also John H.
Holland, Complex Adaptive Systems: A Primer, in WORLDS HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT 1-2 (David
C. Krakauer ed., 2019). Hierarchy is sometimes referred to as "nesting" or "embedding."
96
1 See Simon, supra note 117, at 467.
'97See MEADOWS, supranote 111, at 82.
198See MEADOWS, supranote 111, at 82.
'99See Holland, supranote 195, at 1.
20 0
See MEADOWS, supranote 111, at 83.
20 1
See Hwang, supra note 11, at 1426-27; see also Jennejohn, supra note 12, at 321-22.
94
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components. Hwang's research on unbundled bargains in the M&A
context is an example of contractual hierarchy. 202 As Hwang discusses,
203
M&A deals are effectuated using multiple interrelated contracts. The
M&A deal is a complex system made up of contractual subsystems that
are in turn made up of individual terms. The market for over-the-counter
("OTC") derivatives exhibits hierarchical structure as well.20 Parties
typically enter into multiple derivative transactions over a period of time,
205
These individual
with each derivative represented by a contract.
designed
agreement
derivatives contracts are governed by a central master
206
by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association ("ISDA"). The
derivative relationship between the parties is a contract system composed
of the ISDA master agreement and the individual derivatives contracts,
207
each of which is a contract system composed of terms. Contractual
hierarchy can also be found in venture capital contracting. The following
diagram depicts a venture capital contract system.

Startup's
Venture Financing

Stock Purchase
Agreement

Term 1

Investor Rights
Agreement

Voting
Agreement

Right of First
Refusal

Term 2

Term 3

-

Certificate of
Incorporation

Term m

As can be seen in the diagram above, a startup's venture capital
financing contracts are typically divided into multiple "series" (Series A,
B, C, etc.) associated with similarly titled classes of the company's
preferred stock. 2 0 Each series of venture financing is effectuated by an

202

See
See
2
"See
20
sSee
2
"See
20
7See
208
See
203

supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
Hwang & Jennejohn, supra note 2, at 307-09.
Hwang & Jennejohn, supra note 2, at 307-09.
Hwang & Jennejohn, supra note 2, at 307-09.
Hwang & Jennejohn, supra note 2, at 307-09.
Williams, supra note 69, at 123, 128-30.
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interrelated set of contracts. 2 9 In the U.S., the five primary contracts that
make up a venture capital deal are the Stock Purchase Agreement, the
Right of First Refusal, the Voting Agreement, the Investor Rights
Agreement, and the Certificate of Incorporation.210 Each of these contracts
are in turn composed of multiple interrelated terms.
3. Emergence
Complex systems frequently demonstrate emergence, in which the
system exhibits properties at the system level that are not found at the
component level.2" These properties are said to "emerge" from the
interactions of the individual components and are commonly referred to as
"emergent properties."212 Emergence is the primary reason why a complex
system is greater than the sum of its parts; mere summation of a system's
components does not capture emergent properties. The concept of
emergence originated in the study of evolution and has since been broadly
adopted within complex systems theory.213 A common example of
emergence is the collective intelligence of ant colonies.24 Through the
actions of individual ants and the interaction effects between ants, an ant
colony exhibits unique properties at the system level such as swarm
logic.215 Emergence contributes to a broad range of phenomena across
diverse complex systems, including human consciousness, stock market
crashes, cancer tumors, and climate change. 26

21

See Nat'l Venture Capital Ass'n, §4.4.4 Model Certificate of Incorporation,
https://nvca.org/model-legal-documents.
2
"'Id. While the Certificate of Incorporation is technically not a contract but rather a
corporate charter, it is typically treated and negotiated as a contract in the venture capital context.
See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L.
REV. 757, 761-62 (1995) (discussing corporate charters as contracts).
21
'See JOHNSON, supra note 115, at 18; see JOHNSON, supra note 39, at 4; see MILLER
& PAGE, supranote 39, at 44; see MITCHELL, supra note 106, at 13; see WEST, supranote 111,
at 23.
2 2
1 See JOHNSON, supra note 115, at 18; see JOHNSON, supra note 39, at 4; see MILLER
& PAGE, supra note 39, at 44; see MITCHELL, supra note 106, at 13; see WEST, supranote 111,
at 23.
213

See generally DAVID BLITZ, EMERGENT EVOLUTION: QUALITATIVE NOVELTY AND

THE LEVELS OF REALITY 1 (1992) (discussing the history of emergence); see also Jeffrey
Goldstein, Emergence as a Construct: Historyand Issues, 1 EMERGENCE 49, 53-55 (1999); see
also Peter A. Coming, The Re-Emergence of "Emergence":A Venerable Concept in Search of
a Theory, 7 COMPLEXITY 18, 18-21 (2002); see also Tom De Wolf & Tom Holvoet, Emergence
Versus Self-Organisation: Different Concepts but Promising When Combined, 3464 LECTURE
NOTES IN COMPUTER SCIENCE 1, 2-3 (2005).
214

See JOHNSON, supra note 115, at 29-33, 73-82.
See JOHNSON, supra note 115, at 29-33, 73-82.
216
See Corning, supra note 213, at 18; see also JOHNSON, supra note 39, at 4.
215
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Emergence is closely tied to the hierarchical structure of complex
systems. As was discussed in Section III.C.2, complex systems exhibit
levels of hierarchy in which lower level systems are components of higherlevel systems. The interactions of the lower level systems produce the
emergent properties of the higher-level systems. At the same time, these
7
emergent properties influence the components in the lower level.- As a
result, the relationship between lower level components and the higherlevel emergent properties they produce is bidirectional.- The following
diagram depicts this relationship.

Emergent Property

Component 1

--

+

Component 2

As can be seen in the diagram above, the interaction between the
lower level components produces the higher-level emergent property,
which in turn influences the components. Because an emergent property
is not a property of any of the components, but rather a property of the
system that results from component interactions, emergence can often
2 19
result in surprise and unintended consequences. Fully understanding the
properties of a system's components will not reveal emergent properties
that only appear when the components interact within the system.
Modeling and (potentially) predicting the emergent behavior of a complex
system is one of the primary goals of complex systems theory.
Contract systems exhibit emergence. Interactions between terms in
single-contract systems produce properties at the system level that are not
evident at the term level. For example, two separate promises within a
22
If the promises are
contract can be independent or dependent.
independent, failure to perform promise A does not remove the obligation
to perform promise B. If, however, the promises are dependent, then the
performance of promise A is treated as a constructive condition of the
performance of promise B and vice versa. Whether two promises are

217

See Corning, supra note 213, at 27; see also Tamanaha, supra note 140, at 1150-51.
See Corning, supra note 213, at 27; see also Tamanaha, supra note 140, at 1150-51.
2
See Ruhl, Complexity Theory, supranote 139, at 855-56.
220
See Smith, supranote 9, at 1189.
2
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independent or dependent depends on the interaction of the promises in
the context of the contract system as a whole and therefore cannot be
determined by examining the terms in isolation. As a result, the
independence or dependence of two promises is an emergent property of
the contract at the system level.
Interactions between individual contracts can also produce
emergent properties in multi-contract systems. For example, Marcel
Kahan and Michael Klausner have discussed the presence of learning
benefits and network benefits in networks of contracts.2 2 1 Learning benefits
are associated with terms that have been commonly used in the past.2 2
Network benefits, on the other hand, are associated with terms that are
expected to be used by other parties in the future.211 These externalities
contribute to the prevalence of standardization in contract terms.22 4 In both
instances, terms in individual contracts (either commonly used in the past
or expected to be used in the future), produce the emergent property of
externalities at the multi-contract system level. The emergent externalities
are created by the presence of certain terms at the individual contract level.
At the same time, the externalities influence the likelihood of those same
terms being used in the future. As a result, the relationship between the
terms and the externalities is bidirectional. The evolution functions for the
externalities are based on the states of the terms and the evolution
functions for the terms are based on the externalities.
4. Adaptation
Complex systems are adaptive.221 The states of their components and
the interactions between these components change over time in response
to inputs from their environment.226 The classic example of adaptation is
how systems of living organisms evolve via natural selection.227 Complex
systems are typically viewed as having the capacity to "learn."228 They
iteratively revise and update themselves as they gain experience.2 9 For
example, the human immune system makes progressive improvements

22 1

See Klausner, supra note 210, at 763, 786-87; see Kahan & Klausner, supra note 45,
at 350; see Kahan & Klausner, supranote 64, at 718-27.
"See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 64, at 718.
22 3
See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 64, at 718.
224
See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 64, at 715-17.
22
See JOHNSON, supra note 115, at 18; see WEST, supra note 111, at 23-24; see also
THURNER ET AL., supra note 106, at v.
2 26
See WEST, supranote 111, at 23.
2 27
See WEST, supranote 111, at 23-24.
22
sSee Holland, supranote 195, at 5.
229
See Holland, supranote 195, at 5.
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when exposed to antigens, and typically becomes better-equipped to
respond to future infection.211
23 1
The primary way complex systems adapt is through feedback.
Feedback mechanisms within a complex system receive inputs from the
system's environment and cause the system to change its states and/or
interactions accordingly." These mechanisms are often conceptualized as
"loops" because they cycle information from the environment to the
system.2 11 There are two main types of feedback mechanisms: positive and
negative.23 Positive feedback (also known as reinforcing or destabilizing
2
feedback) moves a system in the direction of the input. 11 For example, as
soil is eroded from a piece of land, fewer plants are able to establish roots
to hold the soil, which leads to more erosion.236 Positive feedback
mechanisms tend to lead to exponential growth or loss. 237 Negative
feedback (also known as balancing or stabilizing feedback), on the other
hand, moves a system in the opposite direction of the input.2 1 For example,
a thermostat causes cold air to flow into a room if the room is too hot and
39
causes warm air to flow into the room if the room is too cold.2
Like other complex systems, contract systems adapt via feedback
mechanisms. 240 The primary feedback mechanism for a contract system is
the transactional lawyer who designs and drafts the contract(s). The
transactional lawyer responds to inputs from the contract system's
24
environment by adding, removing, and/or modifying terms. , This
feedback mechanism can be positive or negative. For example, if a lawyer
identifies that a particular term has become commonplace and therefore
carries less litigation risk, the lawyer will be more likely to use that term

230

See Holland, supra note 195, at 5.
'See JOHNSON, supra note 115, at 137-39; see JOHNSON, supra note 39, at 25-26; see
MEADOWS, supra note 111, at 25-27; see MILLER & PAGE, supra note 39, at 50-53.
23 2
See JOHNSON, supra note 115, at 102-03; see JOHNSON, supra note 39, at 33-34; see
MEADOWS, supra note 111, at 25-27; see MILLER & PAGE, supra note 39, at 50-53.
2 33
See MEADOWS, supranote 111, at 25-27.
2 34
See JOHNSON, supra note 115, at 137-39; see MEADOWS, supra note 111, at 27-34;
see MILLER & PAGE, supra note 39, at 50-53.
23
5See MEADOWS, supranote 111, at 30-32.
2 36
See MEADOWS, supranote 111, at 31.
23
7See MEADOWS, supranote 111, at 30-32.
2 38
See MEADOWS, supranote 111, at 27-30.
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See JOHNSON, supra note 115, at 138.
2
'See Choi & Gulati, supra note 168, at 931-36 (discussing the adaptation of sovereign
debt contracts); see Boardman, supra note 51, at 1112-16 (discussing feedback loops in
insurance contracts); see also Choi, Gulati & Posner, supranote 168, at 3-10, 27, 35 (discussing
the evolutionary cycle of sovereign debt contracts and providing empirical evidence from the
New York and English sovereign debt markets).
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See Choi & Gulati, supra note 168, at 931-36; see Boardman, supra note 51, at 111216; see also Choi, Gulati & Posner, supra note 168, at 3-10, 27, 35.
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again. 242 This is a positive feedback loop that reinforces the term's
prevalence. On the other hand, if a term receives an adverse judicial
interpretation, a lawyer will be less likely to use the term again in its
current form and will instead modify or remove the term.- This is a
negative feedback loop that decreases the term's prevalence. With
sufficient information, a transactional lawyer can toggle between positive
and negative feedback. For example, legal technology companies are in
the early stages of using machine-learning technology to statistically
connect contract terms with contract outcomes.2 4 Using a "predictive
contracting" tool, a lawyer can iteratively adjust the terms of a contract
based on these statistical connections24 The following diagram depicts
this process:

Statistical
Connections

Terms

Outcomes

Transactional
Lawyer

If the predictive contracting tool demonstrates that a term increases
the likelihood of a positive outcome (such as proper, on-time
performance), the lawyer can increase the prevalence of the term in the
future via positive feedback. On the other hand, if the term is shown to be
linked to a negative outcome (such as litigation), the lawyer can decrease
the prevalence of the term in the future via negative feedback.

1

722-23.

2

See Choi & Gulati, supra note 168, at 931; see Kahan & Klausner, supra note 64, at

243

But see GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 51, at 2-3 (discussing the continued widespread
use of a "pari passu" provision in sovereign debt contracts despite an adverse judicial ruling).
See infra Section W.A. (discussing the implications of failures in feedback mechanisms for
contract design).
2
"See Williams, supranote 45, at 631-34. See infra Section IV.C. (discussing the impact
of complex systems on legal technology).
24
.See Williams, supra note 45, at 631-34.
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5. Sensitivity to Initial Conditions
Complex systems are sensitive to their initial conditions.24 The
initial conditions of a complex system include the states of the system's
components, interaction networks, and environment at the time the system
is formed.247 These conditions can be thought of as the "starting point" of
the system. 24 The evolution of a system from time t to time t+1 depends
on the conditions of the system at time t.2 49 Therefore, a system's
evolutionary trajectory depends on the system's original starting point.250
Modifying a system's initial conditions can change its evolution. For
example, starting a snowball at the top of a hill with relatively little snow
will result in a much smaller snowball at the bottom of the hill than a
snowball that is started at the top of a hill packed with snow. Similarly, an
organism that begins its life in an environment rich with resources will
likely evolve differently than an organism that starts in a sparse
environment.
The sensitivity of a complex system to its initial conditions is
2
closely related to the concept of the "adjacent possible." 1"[T]he adjacent
possible of a system at time t is the set of all potential states (or
configurations) of that system that can be reached in the next time step
t+1."252 For example, the adjacent possible for a traveler who finds
themselves at the fork in a road includes four possible states: 1) go left, 2)
go right, 3) turn around, and 4) remain in place. 253 The following diagram
depicts the adjacent possible for a system that begins in state A at time t=1.

246
See JOHNSON, supra note 39, at 32-34; see MITCHELL, supra note 106, at 34; see
THURNER ET AL., supra note 106, at vi.
247
See MITCHELL, supra note 106, at 38.
24
1See MITCHELL, supra note 106, at 31.
249
See MITCHELL, supra note 106, at 31.
250
See JOHNSON, supra note 39, at 32-34; see MITCHELL, supra note 106, at 34; see
THURNER ET AL., supra note 106, at vi.
251
See THURNER ET AL., supra note 106, at 229-30.
2
1 See THURNER ET AL., supra note 106, at 230.
25
.See THURNER ET AL., supra note 106, at 230.
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As can be seen in the diagram above, the set of adjacent possible
states at time t=1 includes states B and C. The system evolves into state B
(represented by the solid arrow), but it could have evolved into state C
(represented by the dashed arrow). Once the system is in state B at time
t=2, the set of adjacent possible states become states D and E. Had the
system evolved into state C instead of state B, the set of adjacent possible
states would be states F and G. The diagram therefore demonstrates an
important point regarding the evolution of complex systems: the set of
adjacent possible states for a system at a given point in time depends on
the state of the system at that point, which in turn depended on the state of
the system in the previous time period, all the way back to the initial state
of the system. As a result, the initial conditions of a system determine all
future adjacent possible states.
Contract systems are sensitive to their initial conditions. For
example, terms in venture financing contracts are often "sticky" - a term
is more likely to appear in a later round of financing if it appeared in an
earlier round.114 In contracts scholarship, this property has typically been
described as "path dependence."1125 Path dependence in contracting has
been linked to a variety of causes, including learning benefits,", network
benefits,"' agency costs,", herd behavior,'21 and cognitive biases such as

254See
2ssSee,
256See
257See
"'See
259See

Williams, supra note 69, at 152.
e.g., Kahan & Klausner, supra note 45, at 348.
Kahan & Klausner, supra note 45, at 350-52.
Kahan & Klausner, supra note 45, at 350-52
Kahan & Klausner, supra note 45, at 353-55.
Kahan & Klausner, supra note 45, at 356-58.
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2
status quo bias, anchoring bias, and conformity bias. 6 Empirical studies
21
have shown that path dependence can persist in contracts over decades.
The evolution functions that determine how a contract system's terms and
interactions change from time t to time t+1 depend on the states of the
26 2
terms, interactions, and environment at time t. As a result, the set of
adjacent possible states at time t depends on the state of the system at time
t, which can be traced all the way back to the initial state of the system at
time t-1.263 Consequently, modifying a contract system's initial conditions
affects the possible states that the system can take in the future.

6. Nonlinearity
Complex systems often exhibit nonlinearity, in which the system
2
does not respond linearly to an input. 6 A linear relationship has constant
proportionality between cause and effect. 2 6 5 For example, doubling the rate
at which water comes out of a faucet will make a pot fill twice as quickly
while tripling the rate will make the pot fill three times as quickly. A
nonlinear relationship, on the other hand, does not have constant
66
proportionality between cause and effect. For example, increasing the
amount of fertilizer on a piece of farm land from ten pounds to twenty
pounds may increase the yield of the land, whereas increasing the amount
of fertilizer to one hundred pounds may actually decrease the yield by
26
damaging the soil with too much fertilizer. , The primary sources of
nonlinearity in a complex system are the interactions between the system's
components. As a result of these interactions, an input from the system's
environment that initially affects one component will often end up
affecting many more. This propagation of the input throughout the system
can lead to nonlinear and unexpected results.
One of the most serious of these unexpected results is a phenomenon
known as cascade failure.26 A cascade failure occurs when the failure of

2

6See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 45, at 359-64; see also Russell Korobkin, Inertia
andPreference in ContractNegotiation: The PsychologicalPower of Default Rules andForm
Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1586 (1998).
261
See, e.g., Anderson & Manns, supra note 71, at 58-61 (finding path dependence in
merger agreements over a twenty-year period).
26 2
See THURNER ET AL., supra note 106, at 227-28.
263
See THURNER ET AL., supra note 106, at 227-28.
2
"See JOHNSON, supra note 39, at 40; see MILLER & PAGE, supra note 39, at 216; see
MEADOWS, supra note 111, at 91-94; see MITCHELL, supra note 106, at 22-27; see WEST, supra
note 111, at 17-19; see THURNER ET AL., supra note 106, at 23.
265
See MEADOWS, supra note 111, at 91.
266
See MEADOWS, supra note 111, at 91.
267
See MEADOWS, supra note 111, at 91.
26 5
See MITCHELL, supranote 106, at 255-57.
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one component (or a small number of components) results in the failure of
connected components, which in turn cause the failure of additional
connected components until there is a system-wide failure.211 Visually, a
cascade failure looks like a classic set of domino tiles being toppled by a
single piece. Cascade failures can occur in a variety of different complex
systems. For example, in 2003, a power plant in Ohio shutdown
unexpectedly.270 Electricity demand normally served by that plant was
shifted to other plants, causing them to overload and shut down.21 In the
end, over fifty million people lost power throughout the United States and
Canada.272 Cascade failures can be particularly severe in the finance
industry in which interconnected financial entities can produce high levels
of systemic risk.273 Scholars have begun to use complex systems theory to
advocate for more effective financial regulation aimed at preventing
cascade failures.274
Contract systems can have nonlinear responses to inputs from their
environment as a result of the interactions between terms. For example, a
judicial interpretation of a particular term may impact numerous other
terms as well. The extent to which an interpretation will have a nonlinear,
system-wide effect depends on the structure of the interaction networks in
the contract. The following network represents a contract system with
multiple interconnected terms.

A
C

E

B
D
As can be seen in the network above, terms A, B, C and D are
connected via interactions, as are terms E and F. All else equal, an
interpretation that changes the meaning of term A is more likely to result
in a nonlinear response than an interpretation that changes the meaning of
term E because term A is connected to more terms than term E. If the
interpretation were to render the term ineffective, the interpretation could
potentially result in a cascade failure that would render the entire contract

269

See MITCHELL, supra note
See MITCHELL, supra note
271
See MITCHELL, supra note
272
See MITCHELL, supra note
273
See MITCHELL, supra note
274
See, e.g., Allen, supra note
270

106, at 255-57.
106, at 256.
106, at 256.
106, at 256.
106, at 256.
142, at 10-21.
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ineffective.25 Once again, all else equal, term A is more likely to cause a
cascade failure than term E.
As this example demonstrates, the "connectedness" of a term is a
critical characteristic for understanding the role of the term in the overall
contract system. The simplest measure of the connectedness of a term is
the "degree" of the term: the number of interaction links connected to the
term.276 In the network above, the degree of term A is two whereas the
degree of term E is one. An alternative measure of the connectedness of a
term is the "nearest-neighbor degree" of the term: the average degree of
all the terms with which the term in question is connected.27, In the network
above, the nearest-neighbor degree of term A is 2.5278 whereas the nearestneighbor degree of term E is one. By either measure, term A is more
"connected" than term E. The Appendix provides equations for calculating
9
these measures of connectedness.
7. Punctuated Equilibria
Complex systems often evolve via punctuated equilibria, in which
long periods of equilibrium with relatively little change are periodically
280
punctuated by shorter periods of substantial change. These periods of
change typically come in the form of extreme "boom" and "bust" events
2
precipitated by environmental shocks to the system. ' Theories of
punctuated equilibria originated in the 1960s and 1970s as criticisms of
28 2
the prevailing "gradualist" view of evolution. According to punctuated
equilibria models of evolution, complex systems exhibit multiple
2
equilibria. 2 3 These multiple equilibria do not last forever. 1 Rather, they

27 5

See infra Section IV.B. (discussing the implications of cascade failure for contract
interpretation).
276See THURNER ET AL., supra note 106, at 150-51.
2 7
7 See THURNER ET AL., supra note 106, at 152.
278
Term A has two neighboring terms, B and C. The degree of term B is three and the
degree of term C is two. The nearest-neighbor degree of term A is therefore (3+2)/2= 2.5.
2
.There are other potential measures of connectedness that are beyond the scope of this
Article, including centrality, clustering, and community. See THURNER ET AL., supra note 106,
at 154-58, 177-83.
280
See MITCHELL, supra note 106, at 84-85; see THURNER ET AL., supra note 106, at
224-25.
281
See THURNER ET AL., supra note 106, at 224.
282
See MITCHELL, supra note 106, at 84-85.
283
See JOHNSON, supra note 39, at 20-21; see also Richard Palmer, Can Physics
Contribute to Economics?, in WORLDS HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT 26 (David C. Krakauer ed.,
2019); see MILLER & PAGE, supra note 39, at 83.
2 4
1 See THURNER ET AL., supra note 106, at 233-34.
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are said to be "metastable."215 As a result, the evolution of a complex
system is an open-ended progression "from one metastable equilibrium to
the next."2 6 Empirical evidence of punctuated equilibria can be found in a
broad range of complex systems, including biological, social, and
technological systems.2
The evolutionary trajectories of contract systems frequently feature
punctuated equilibria. 288 A period of substantial change in a contract
system is often driven by a shock from the system's environment.29 For
example, Stephen Choi and Mitu Gulati have described how "interpretive
shocks" (adverse judicial interpretations that substantially alter the
meaning of a term) can disrupt periods of contract standardization (i.e.,
equilibrium) and lead to innovation."0 Together with Eric Posner, Choi
and Gulati have proposed a "three-stage" model of contract evolution: 1)
pre-shock standardization, 2) post-shock innovation, and 3) postinnovation standardization.29 They empirically support this model with
evidence from the New York and English sovereign debt markets.292 Their
model describes how a sovereign debt contract system moves from one
metastable equilibrium to another as the result of an environmental
shock.293
Inflection points in a contract system's evolution can be identified
by measuring the change in the system's terms and interactions between
time periods. 294 Large shifts in terms and interactions represent key periods
of evolutionary change.295 The change in a term between two points in time
can be measured by the difference in its state functions at those points.296
For example, assume that the state function for term A is a binary function
that is equal to one if term A is present in the contract and zero if term A
is not present. If the difference between term A's state function in 2021
and 2020 is equal to one, this means that term A was present in 2021 but
not in 2020. On the other hand, if the difference is equal to negative one,
this means that term A was not present in 2021 but was present in 2020. If
2 85

See THURNER ET AL., supra note 106, at 233-34.
See THURNER ET AL., supra note 106, at 233-34.
287
See THURNER ET AL., supra note 106, at 232-36.
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Mark C. Niles, PunctuatedEquilibrium:A modelfor Administrative Evolution, 44 J.
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the difference is equal to zero, this means that the presence of term A did
not change between 2020 and 2021.297 The overall change in a system's
terms can be measured by the aggregate change in its individual terms.
The Appendix provides equations for calculating the change in individual
terms as well as the aggregate change in a system's terms.
As for changes in a system's interactions, the change in a particular
interaction type between two points in time can be measured by the
difference in its interaction networks at those points. For example, assume
that interaction type X is represented by the following interaction networks

in 2020 and 2021:

2020

2021
A

A
C

C

B
D

D

As can be seen in the diagram above, the interaction between terms
A and C was present in 2020, but not in 2021. The difference in these
networks (the removal of the interaction between terms A and C)
represents the change in interaction type X between 2020 and 2021. The
overall change in a system's interactions can be measured by the aggregate
change in its interaction networks. The Appendix provides equations for
calculating the change in individual interaction networks as well as the
aggregate change in a system's interactions. Key periods of punctuated
change in a contract system will typically display above-average degrees
of change in terms and interactions.
The previous section modeled a contract as a complex system and
identified key properties of a contract system. The next section draws on
the model and properties discussed here to examine the implications of a
complex systems approach to contracts.

297

This would be true if either term A was present at both times or was not present at
both times.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTRACT DESIGN, INTERPRETATION, AND
ANALYSIS

This section discusses the implications of a complex systems
approach to contracts for contract design, interpretation, and analysis.
Section IV.A discusses design, Section IV.B discusses interpretation, and
Section IV.C discusses analysis.
A. Design
Viewing a contract as a complex system has significant implications
for how transactional lawyers design contracts. First, by taking a complex
systems approach to contracts, lawyers can design more efficient,
effective, and resilient contracts. While transactional lawyers are often
aware that individual terms can often have broader effects,' complex
systems theory provides a robust framework for considering the systemic
effects of ex ante design decisions. For example, much of modern contract
drafting is form-based; lawyers begin with a precedent contract and tweak
it based on the specifics of the transaction at hand.299 Yet adding, removing,
and/or modifying individual terms in a precedent contract can have effects
on other terms throughout the contract due to interaction effects between
terms. Furthermore, altering terms can affect emergent properties that are
only evident at the contract system level. For example, if terms A and B
interact as dependent promises, then changing either term could
potentially remove this dependency from the system. Making contract
design decisions without considering the impact on interaction networks
and emergent properties can lead to unintended consequences such as
cascade failure.300 As a result, it is critical for transactional lawyers to
understand the systemic nature of the contract they are designing. When
engaging in form-based drafting, the drafter should be aware of the
connectedness of the terms they are modifying. All else equal, modifying
a more connected term is more likely to result in a nonlinear response.
Quantitative measures of connectedness such as the degree or nearestneighbor degree of a term can help a drafter determine which terms in the
contract are most connected. 301 The drafter can then use this information to
modify the contract in a manner that is conscious of the effects of

298
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29 9
See Klausner, supra note 210, at 762; Hill, supra note 51, at 59-63; Choi, Gulati
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individual terms on the contract as a whole. This ex ante modification
process can be supplemented with software tools that visualize the
contract's interaction networks and enable the computation of
connectedness measures.
Second, complex systems theory enables contract designers to make
better-informed tradeoffs during the design process. Robert Scott and
George Triantis have described how contract designers balance front-end
32
design costs against back-end litigation costs. Investing in greater term
specificity on the front-end reduces the likelihood (and therefore cost) of
litigation on the back-end.3" Yet Scott and Triantis frame cost balancing
as a decision that contract designers make on a term-by-term basis.30
While the design of an individual term does affect front-end and back-end
costs, it also affects other terms within the contract as well as emergent
properties at the system level. As a result, contract designers should
consider the effects on interaction networks and emergent properties when
engaging in cost balancing.
Contract designers also make tradeoffs between terms when
305
designing a contract that must respond to a variety of transaction costs.
As discussed by Matthew Jennejohn, transactional lawyers use different
3
kinds of terms to respond to different kinds of transaction costs. 0 This is
a critical aspect of a transactional lawyer's role as a transaction cost
engineer seeking to reduce overall transaction costs associated with a
contract.30 7 Yet individual terms can often conflict with one another,
therefore, a lawyer must frequently make tradeoffs in how to respond to
transaction costs. 30 For example, the use of a committee in an interfirm
innovation alliance contract can assist with the division of intellectual
3
property rights, yet also cause holdup concerns for other parts of the deal. 0
Consequently, having a qualitative and quantitative understanding of the
interactions between terms can better-equip a lawyer to make these
tradeoffs. For example, assume that a lawyer uses term A to respond to
cost X and term B to respond to cost Y and that terms A and B are linked
via term C. Assume as well that in the contract's current form,
strengthening term A's ability to respond to cost X weakens term B's
ability to respond to cost Y and vice versa. Equipped with the knowledge

302

See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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that terms A and B interact via term C, the lawyer could potentially
restructure the contract by disconnecting term A and/or term B from term
C, thereby enabling terms A and B to respond to their respective costs
without interfering with one another.
Third, modeling a contract as a complex system advances the
understanding of contract structure and its importance. Cathy Hwang and
Matthew Jennejohn have compellingly argued that the structure of a
contract plays a significant role in contract design.310 Yet Hwang and
Jennejohn primarily frame contract structure as whether a contract is
modular, integrated, or hybrid.311 While these are three broad categories of
contract structure, systems analysis can add a substantial amount of detail
and granularity. The multilayered networks that represent a contract's
interactions provide interaction information for every pairwise
combination of terms for every type of interaction in the contract system.
This information can be used to visually represent the contract's structure
as a multilayered set of network maps. A contract designer can then use
these maps to better understand where the contract's structure falls along
the modular-integrated spectrum. A contract on the modular end of the
spectrum will have maps of terms that primarily interact with other terms
in the same cluster. On the other hand, a contract on the integrated end up
the spectrum will have much more interaction between clusters. A
designer can also use quantitative connectedness measures to identify the
most critical terms in the contract's structure, such as central terms in
conceptual subsystems.312 For example, the term in a venture financing that
governs the sale of preferred stock from the company to investors is a
highly connected term that is critical to the structure of the overall deal
system."'
Fourth, framing a contract as a complex system highlights the
significance of factors outside of the contract for the contract's design.
Complex systems theory emphasizes the importance of a system's
environment, and this holds true in the context of contract systems as well.
When designing a contract, a contract designer should take into account
potential inputs from the contract's environment and how the contract will
respond to those inputs. For example, a transactional lawyer drafting a
force majeure clause should be aware of the set of triggering events that
could potentially render either party unable to perform under the contract.

I"See Hwang & Jennejohn, supra note 2, at 281.
3
"See Hwang & Jennejohn, supra note 2, at 281.
3
"See Nat'l Venture Capital Assn Model Stock Purchase Agreement § 1.1, Model Legal
Documents (July 2020), https://nvca.org/recommends/nvca-2020-stock-purchase-agreement-2/.
313Id.
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Furthermore, systems analysis can aid contract designers in drafting
contracts that are more resilient to exogenous shocks such as adverse
judicial interpretations.314 Restructuring a contract to eliminate
unnecessary interactions between terms reduces the likelihood of an
undesirable nonlinear response to an interpretive shock. Using interaction
networks, a contract drafter can minimize the potential for cascade failure
and thereby better protect their client."' Taking a systems approach to
contract design also encourages contract designers to consider how an
individual contract fits into the hierarchy of a higher order system, such as
a network of interrelated contracts.316 In M&A and venture capital deals,
for example, transactional lawyers should design contracts not as
standalone documents, but rather as components of multi-contract deal
systems.317
Fifth, complex systems theory brings to light the critical role of
transactional lawyers as the primary feedback mechanism in most contract
systems.3" Contract systems evolve as transactional lawyers update the
319
design of the system based on environmental inputs. If, however, the
transactional lawyer does not update the contract based on environmental
inputs, then the contract system's primary method of adaptation breaks
down. For example, Mitu Gulati and Robert Scott documented how
transactional lawyers in the sovereign debt industry continued to use a
"pari passu" provision in sovereign debts contracts despite an adverse
3 20
judicial interpretation that negatively changed the meaning of the term.
In addition, other scholars have noted that many modifications made to
contracts by transactional lawyers are inefficient or harmful to client
interests.321 Framing transactional lawyers as feedback mechanisms in a
contract system can help identify common systems solutions for
responding to feedback issues. For example, one of the most common
problems with a feedback mechanism is that the mechanism is not properly
receiving the input from the environment and therefore cannot update the
system accordingly. 322 This problem is evident in contract systems because
the transactional lawyers who draft contracts are not the same lawyers who
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See infra Sections IV.B and IV.C.
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litigate contracts. Scholars have noted that there is little interaction
between drafters and litigators,323 and that transactional lawyers lack the
incentive to follow up with the litigation outcomes of contracts they
draft.24 As a result, providing transactional lawyers with better
information on litigation outcomes and better incentives to stay informed
would improve their ability to function as effective feedback mechanisms
for contract systems.
B. Interpretation
Judges who interpret contracts should take a complex systems
approach to contract interpretation. First, as is the case with transactional
lawyers who design contracts, judges will benefit from understanding a
contract's systemic nature, including the interactions between terms and
unique properties that emerge at the system level. When a judge interprets
a term in a contract, the judge is not just interpreting that term. Rather, the
judge is interpreting a component of a contract system that is potentially
connected with many other terms via interaction networks and possibly
yields one or more emergent properties. In most cases, the judge's
interpretation decision will affect much more than the term at hand. For
example, the interpretation of a term in a M&A or VC deal will likely
affect other terms and even other contracts in the overall deal system.
Interpreting interconnected deal documents as components of a higherorder deal system will increase the stability of individual terms because
judges will be more mindful of potential ripple effects of term-level
interpretation." Furthermore, any contract law precedent that a judge
establishes during interpretation will become part of the environment for
future contract systems.
Fortunately, judges already engage in quasi-systems analysis on a
regular basis. For example, when a judge is faced with a decision regarding
whether two promises in a contract are independent or dependent, the
judge is essentially analyzing whether the two terms are linked in the
interaction network that represents constructive conditions within the
contract system. Complex systems theory supplements current interpretive
principles by providing an established and methodical framework for
viewing contracts as complex systems. Framing interpretation within a
systems context will help judges make decisions that more accurately
reflect the systemic nature of contracts.
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See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 51, at 4.

3

3

`See Hill, supra note 51, at 69.

"Thank you to Cathy Hwang for this helpful point.
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Second, the presence of interaction networks within a contract
system is particularly important for judges making severability
determinations. If a judge determines that a particular term is not
enforceable, the judge can either invalidate the contract as a whole or
"sever" (i.e., remove) the unenforceable term and enforce the remainder of
the contract.3 2 6 Severability determinations often turn on whether the
327
unenforceable term in question is seen as integral to the contract. If the
term is too important to the overall contract, the judge will typically
invalidate the entire contract. 2 1 On the other hand, if the term is relatively
3 29
unimportant, the judge will often sever the offending term. Contracts
frequently contain a severability provision that states that the terms of the
contract are severable and that a judge should always uphold the remainder
of the contract in the event a term is found to be unenforceable.-o
Enforcing a contract without a critical term, however, can lead to cascade
failure in which the absence of that term renders the remainder of the
contract unable to function. Consequently, having an understanding of the
interaction networks in a contract system and the connectedness of the
terms can enable judges to make better severability determinations. All
else equal, a more connected term is more likely to lead to cascade failure
and is therefore less suitable for severance. Quantitative measures of
connectedness, such as the degree or nearest-neighbor-degree of a term,
can therefore help judges determine which terms can be properly severed
and which terms cannot. Network analysis can also assist judges in
determining whether to enforce a severability clause. If a severability
clause would require a judge to enforce the remainder of a contract
destined for cascade failure due to the removal of a key term, the judge
should instead refuse to enforce the severability clause and invalidate the
entire contract.
Third, complex systems theory informs the ongoing debate between
textualist and contextualist interpretation."' Proponents of textualism
argue for a "four corners" approach to contract interpretation in which
judges should only consider the written text of the contract when making
interpretation decisions.332 Proponents of contextualism, on the other hand,
believe that judges should look beyond the written contract to sources of

326

See

DOUGLAS J. WHALEY & DAVID HORTON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS

704 (8th ed., 2019).
ON CONTRACTS
32
Nd.
328
329

d.

Id.
33 0
See Hwang & Jennejohn, supra note 2, at 325.
33
.See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
332
See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
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extrinsic evidence including industry standards and reputational norms.333
In the context of complex systems, the textualism versus contextualism
debate can be framed in terms of the boundary between the contract system
and its environment. In this framing, textualism can be seen as a
requirement that judges limit their interpretive analysis to the contract
system and that any sources of evidence beyond the system's boundary be
ignored. As a result, textualism views a contract as a closed system for
purposes of interpretation. 14 Contextualism, on the other hand, allows
judges to go beyond the contract system's boundary to consider
environmental conditions.-" In this way, contextualism views a contract as
an open system for purposes of interpretation.-36 Given that contract
systems are primarily open systems, contextualism allows judges to
interpret contract systems as they exist in the real-world. Furthermore,
contextualism enables judges to consider the role a contract system may
play as a component of a higher order system, such as a venture capital or
M&A multi-contract deal system. Textualism, however, requires a judge
to artificially close an otherwise open system for interpretive analysis. As
a result, contextualism is more closely aligned with the systemic nature of
contracts.
Fourth, modeling a contract as a complex system provides a vehicle
for using historical contract data to inform interpretation. Choi and Gulati
have proposed a theory of contract interpretation in which judges consider
a contract's history in a manner akin to statutory interpretation."' The
evolution of a contract system's term state functions and interaction
networks provide critical historical context for this theory of
interpretation.338 This historical data can be used to identify key periods of
evolutionary change in the contract's history.339 A contract system's
evolution functions can offer valuable insights into how a contract's terms
and interactions developed over time.340 Furthermore, judges can examine
the system's initial conditions to better understand the context in which the
contract system was initially formed.4, Historical analysis of a contract

33 3

See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text. The Uniform Commercial Code
explicitly adopts a contextualist approach to the interpretation of goods contracts. See supra note
55.
3
` See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
"'See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
" 6See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
3
"See Choi & Gulati, supra note 58, at 1131-32, 1160-61.
3
"See id.
3
"See id.
340
See id.
"'See Choi & Gulati, supra note 58, at 1131-32, 1160-61.
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system's initial conditions and evolution can assist judges in making
2
historically informed interpretation decisions.2
C. Analysis
In addition to contract design and interpretation, complex systems
theory has implications for contract analysis, particularly for
technologically enabled methods of contract analysis used by legal
technology companies. This section discusses the implications of a
systems approach to contracts for the following three contract analysis
technologies: natural language processing, prediction, and computable
contracts.
First, natural language processing ("NLP") is a form of statistical
machine learning technology that enables computers to understand natural
3
language communication, such as documents written in English. 14 NLP
models are typically "trained" on large data sets of natural language
documents.3 4 Via this training, NLP models "learn" "to understand natural
language text based on statistical relationships between components of the
text such as individual words, groups of words, word sequencing, and
34 5
physical layout features like paragraph breaks and page positioning."
Once trained, an NLP model can be applied to natural language documents
outside the training set. 3" Numerous legal technology companies are using
NLP to break natural language contracts down into their constituent
terms.34 7 While current NLP models are highly effective at decomposing
natural language contracts, these models are often built from a reductionist
perspective.3 1 The goal of these technologies is to deconstruct otherwise
349
unwieldy natural language contracts into structured term data. Yet the
individual terms of a contract system only tell part of the system's story.
Without properly reflecting term interactions and emergent properties,
NLP-based contract analysis technologies are inaccurately representing
contract systems. Instead, legal technology companies should build NLP
models from a systems perspective. Individual terms should not be viewed
only as terms, but rather as components of the overall contract system. In

342See id.
343

See Williams, supra note 45, at 653.
"See Williams, supra note 45, at 653.
34 3
See Williams, supra note 45, at 653.
346
See Williams, supra note 45, at 653.
347
See Williams, supranote 45, at 653-54. These companies include Contract Standards,
eBrevia, Kira Systems, LawGeex, Legal Robot, and LegalSifter.
34
1See Williams, supra note 45, at 653-54
349
See Williams, supra note 45, at 653-54.
3
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addition to breaking natural language contracts down into their constituent
terms, NLP models should be trained to identify the contract's interaction
networks and emergent properties. Explicit textual interactions, such as
cross-references and definitions, will be relatively easy to identify."'
Conceptual interactions and emergent properties will be more difficult to
identify, but NLP models are technologically capable of this task given
that existing models are already being used to identify conceptual
connections in natural language documents.' For example, researchers
have developed NLP models for automatically detecting implicit semantic
connections between civil code sections.-2 Systems-oriented NLP models
will paint a more accurate picture of contract systems.
Second, complex systems theory can be used to improve machine
learning-enabled contract prediction technologies. These technologies use
machine learning models to statistically connect contract terms with
contract outcomes such as litigation or arbitration."' These statistical
insights can then be used to inform future contract design.114 For example,
if a term is identified to be more likely to result in costly litigation than
similar alternatives, a contract drafter can replace the term with a less risky
term in future iterations of the contract. While contract prediction
technologies are still in a nascent stage of development, legal technology
companies are actively building systems that identify connections between
terms and outcomes."' As is the case with NLP models, however,
statistical prediction models need to account for the systemic nature of
contracts. Identifying statistical connections between individual terms and
outcomes is insufficient and can potentially lead to inaccurate conclusions.
For example, assume a prediction technology identifies that terms A and
B are shown to increase the likelihood of a particular negative outcome
(such as litigation). Using this information, a contract drafter may decide
to remove term A and/or B from a future version of the contract. It may be
the case, however, that neither term A nor term B is individually causing
the negative outcome. Instead, the outcome could be caused by an

... See Morayo Adedjouma, Mehrdad Sabetzadeh & Lionel Briand, Automated
Detection and Resolution of Legal Cross References: Approach and a Study of Luxemborg's
Legislation, 1-7 (2014).
"'See Williams, supra note 45, at 670-71.
352
See Jorg Landthaler, Bernhard Waltl & Florian Matthes, Unveiling References in
Legal Texts: Implicit Versus Explicit Network Structures, 4-7 (2016).
33
1 See Williams, supra note 45, at 631-34.
4
11 See Williams, supranote 45, at 631-34.
355
For example, Sirion Labs, a contract management technology company, enables its
users to quantitatively track terms in their contracts that are linked to disputes, as well as the
outcomes of those disputes and any associated costs. See Williams, supra note 45, at 651-52.
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emergent property that results from the interaction of terms A and B as
depicted in the following diagram.

Term A
Emergent Property

Outcome

Term B

As can be seen in the diagram above, the negative outcome is being
driven by the emergent property. As a result, the contract drafter could
reduce the likelihood of the outcome while still keeping terms A and B in
the contract by removing the interaction between terms A and B that gives
rise to the emergent property.
In addition to improving the accuracy of contract prediction
technologies, complex systems theory can also help explain the statistical
results produced by such models. Statistical machine learning models
often take a "black box" approach in which they identify statistical
connections between independent variables (terms) and dependent
variables (outcomes) without specifying the nature of the relationship
between these variables. 356 While black box models are useful for
identifying statistical connections between contract terms and outcomes,
they do not necessarily help contract drafters understand why these
connections exist.57 Modeling a contract as a complex system can shed
light on statistical connections identified by prediction models. By
modeling the nature and behavior of a contract system, a contract drafter
will be better equipped to understand why the system produces certain
results. Furthermore, with sufficient data on terms, interactions, and
environmental conditions, a drafter can specify the contract system's
evolution functions. These evolution functions will demonstrate how the
contract system responded to past environmental shocks during key
periods of system change. They can then be used as the starting point for
predicting how the system will respond to future shocks.
Third, a complex systems approach to contracts promotes the
development and adoption of computable contracts. Computable contracts
(commonly referred to as "smart" contracts) are contracts that are both

356

See Williams, supra note 45, at 635.
See Williams, supra note 45, at 688-89.
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machine-readable and machine-executable.358 Unlike natural language
contracts, computable contracts are written in computer languages that are
interpretable by machines."59 Computable contracts can be thought of as
pieces of software written to represent a contract in a machine-readable
form. These contracts are becoming increasingly common with the advent
of blockchain-enabled computable contracting platforms, such as
Ethereum.360 Computable contracts are an ideal method of representing the
systemic nature of contracts. Each term in a contract can be coded as a
function that represents the term's role in the overall contract system.
Interactions between term functions can be directly and clearly represented
in the contract's code, as can any resulting emergent properties. Unlike a
traditional contract in which the system's architecture has to be deduced
from imprecise natural language, the entirety of a computable contract
system can be discerned from the contract's source code. With sufficient
ex ante testing and debugging, a computable contract drafter can
substantially reduce the likelihood of unintended consequences, such as
cascade failure. The relationship between complex systems theory and
computable contracts is mutually beneficial. Computable contracts are the
most effective and accurate way of representing contracts as systems. At
the same time, complex systems theory can inform the design of
computable contracts so that drafters can fully harness the systems
capabilities of contracts.
V. CONCLUSION

Contracts have long been described as collections of terms that can
be understood through their constituent parts. Yet this traditional
reductionist approach has failed to accurately capture the systemic nature
of contracts. A contract is much more complex than its individual terms
would suggest. Seeking to paint a more accurate picture, this Article
applied complex systems theory to contracts for the first time, arguing that
a contract is a complex system that is greater than the sum of its terms.
The article began by modeling a contract system using concepts drawn
from complex systems theory. In this model, a contract system was
represented as a coevolving multilayer network that exists within an

"'See Williams, supra note 45, at 656 (describing a contract as machine-readable if it
is written in a language that is interpretable by a computer); see also Williams, supra note 45, at
656-58 (describing a contract as machine-executable if a computer can automatically execute
the contract when supplied with real-world performance data).
3 9
See Williams, supra note 45, at 657.
360
See Williams, supra note 45, at 660-61. Ethereum enables users to "draft"computable
contracts using Ethereum's contract-oriented programming language, Solidity.
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environment that contains external conditions, such as contract law and
norms. The Article then used this model to identify and discuss key
properties of complex systems that are exhibited by contract systems,
including organized complexity, hierarchy, emergence, adaptation,
sensitivity to initial conditions, nonlinearity, and punctuated equilibria.
The Article ended by discussing the implications of a complex systems
approach to contracts for contract design by transactional lawyers, contract
interpretation by judges, and contract analysis by legal technology
companies.
This Article has laid the groundwork for further research on contract
systems. First, empirical research is needed to demonstrate the
applicability of the model developed in this Article to real-world contracts.
For example, it would be illustrative to empirically construct the set of
interaction networks that make up the multilayer network of a real-world
contract system and then analyze the networks using network analysis
techniques. In addition, historical contract data could be used to specify
the evolution functions for a real-world contract to better understand how
contracts evolve. Furthermore, empirical analysis of the complexity of
different categories of contracts would shed light on what makes certain
types of contracts more complex than others. Second, many of the contract
system properties identified in the Article would benefit from additional
attention and theorization. Third, further research into how complex
systems theory can be applied to natural language processing, contract
prediction, and the design of computable contracts would advance the
implementation of these valuable contract technologies.
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VI. APPENDIX

Section A of the Appendix provides a formal presentation of the
model discussed in Section III.B. Section B of the Appendix provides
equations for the measures discussed in Section III.C.

A. Model
Assume a contract system with n discrete terms. Each term i is
represented in the model by a state function oi that gives the state of the
term at time t:
-i(t) for all terms i, 1 ... n
There are m interaction types in the contract system. Each
interaction type a is represented in the model by an interaction network
with a corresponding adjacency matrix M" that gives the state of the
interaction network at time t:161
M (t) for all interaction types a, 1 ... m
The contract is an open system that exists within an environment E
that changes over time.

"'See THURNER ET AL., supra note 106, at 145-46. An adjacency matrix is a tool that
can be used to quantitatively represent a network. An adjacency matrix is a grid in which the
rows and columns correspond to the nodes in the network. If the network has n nodes, the
corresponding adjacency matrix will have n rows and n columns. The element located in the
matrix in the ith row and the jth column (indicated as (ij)) represents the interaction between
node i and node j. For an undirected, unweighted network, if there is an interaction between
node i and node j, the elements located in positions (ij) and (i,i) will be equal to 1. If there is no
interaction between node i and node j, then the elements located in positions (ij) and (j,i) will
be equal to 0. For example, assume an undirected, unweighted network with four nodes in which
node One interacts with node Two, node Two interactions with node One, and nodes Three and
Four do not interact with any nodes. The following adjacency matrix represents this network:

0 1 0 0
M=

1
0

0 0
0 0

0
0

0 0 0 0
As can be seen above, the matrix has four rows and four columns corresponding to the
four nodes in the network. The element located in the first row and the second column equals 1
because node One interacts with node Two. Similarly, the element located in the second row
and the first column also equals 1 because node Two interacts with node One. All other elements
in the matrix are equal to 0 because nodes Three and Four do not interact with any nodes and
none of the nodes interact with themselves.
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The initial conditions of the contract system at time t=1 include the
following:

ai(t = 1) for all

"

The states of the terms given by
terms i, 1 ... n

"

The states of the interactions given by M5 (t = 1) for
all interaction types a, 1 ... m

"

The state of the environment given by E (t = 1)

The term state function for each term i evolves according to
an evolution function Fjer"s that has as its parameters the states of
362
the terms, interaction networks, and environment at time t:
Sai(t) = FLrerms

(o(t), ... on(t), Mh (t), ... Mm (t), E(t))

for all terms i, 1 ... n

The state of term i at time t+1 is therefore given by:

o-i(t + 1) = o-i(t) + Fiers(t) for all terms i, 1 ... n
The interaction network for each interaction type a evolves
according to an evolution function Fanteractions that has as its parameters
the states of the terms, interaction networks, and environment at time t:
.!M (t) = Flnteractions

(o(t), ... an(t),

E(t)) for all

interaction types a, 1 ... m
The interaction network for interaction type a at time t+1 is
therefore given by:
Ml (t + 1) =

362

M5 (t)

+ Fanteractions(t) for all interaction types

a, 1 ... m

The derivative notation used here should not be interpreted as an actual derivative,
but rather as the change between discrete time periods. See THURNER ET AL., supra note 106, at
24.
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B. Measures
All of the following measures assume undirected, unweighted
networks.
The total complexity of the contract system at time t is given by: 363

Total Complexity(t) = ZLJa M (t)
2
The average complexity of the contract system at time t is given by:

Average Complexity(t) =

a MG (t)

_

2n

The complexity density of the contract system at time t is given by:

Complexity Density(t) =

Zij, Mj (t)

n(n - 1)

The degree of term i at time t is given by:
Degreei(t) =

M (t)
ja

The nearest-neighbor degree of term i at time t is given by:

Nearest - Neighbor Degreei(t) =

is neighbor of iDegreej(t)
j is neighbor of i1

The change Ai in term i between time t and time t'is given by:
CC~t -

363

t) = ai(t')

-

-i(t)

The following measures of complexity only account for complexity arising from
interactions between terms. These measures do not account for interactions between the system
and its environment.
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"

Assuming that all terms in a contract system are represented by
binary state functions, the total change in terms Arenns between time t and
time t'is given by: 3
|AW(t' - t)I

ATerms(t' - t) =

The change Aa in interaction type a between time t and time t' is given by:

hA,(t' - t) = Mj (t') - Mg (t)
The total change in interactions Ainteractions between time t and time t' is
given by:
S

Ainteractions(t'

3

- t)

=

a|IAa(t' -

t)|

2

"If the terms are represented by different types of state functions (binary, continuous,
categorical, etc.), the changes in terms would need to be normalized before being aggregated.
This is beyond the scope of this Article.

